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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Confessions of a Comparatist (Part I*)
E r ic  S t e in **
I. Introduction
This essay is a record of an episode in the ageless learning process rather 
than a comprehensive account of post-communist constitution making.1 It 
focuses on the cluster of people brought together under the name of 
Czechoslovakia because - apart from strong personal reasons which will 
become readily apparent - that country, one of the number of troubled 
‘ethno-territorial’2 groupings in Western and Eastern Europe, possesses
Part II of this essay will contain an analysis of the developments following the 
adoption of the 1990 law and concluding observations which will attempt to link the 
data to the general propositions in the introductory sections of Part I.
** Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School.
1 See on this, Cutler and Schwartz, "Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia," 58 Chi. 
L.R. 511 (No. 2, Spring 1991). See generally Ludwikowski, "Searching for a New 
Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe," 17 Syracuse J.Int’l L.& Comp.L.91 
(1991); Saladin, "Self-determination, Minority Rights and Constitutional 
Accommodation: The Example of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic," 13 Mich. 
J. Int’l. L. 172 (1991); Schwartz, "Constitutional Developments in East Central Europe," 
45 J’l Int’l Affairs 71 (Columbia U., no. 1, 1991); Slapnicka, "Das tschechoslovakische 
Verfassungsprovisorium," 37 Osteuropa Recht 257 (Dec. 1991); Lijphart, 
"Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
1989-91," 4 J. Theoret. Stud. 207 (1992).
2 Thompson and Rudolph, Jr., "The Ebb and Flow of Ethnoterritorial Politics in the 
Western World" in J.R. Rudolph, Jr. and R.J. Thompson, Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, 
and the Western World 1 at 2 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 1989), 
use "ethnoterritorial" "for various political movements and conflicts that are derived 
from a group of people,...having some identifiable geographic base within the boundaries 



























































































certain discrete characteristics that merit an inquiry into its search for a new 
constitutional framework.
My hope is that this piece, idiosyncratic as it is, will provide some 
insights into the many-splendored idea of federalism, the ubiquitous 
problem of cross-frontier transferability of institutions, and, last but not 
least, into the uneasy interaction between constitution making and the 
transition from a totalitarian-formed to a civil society in an atmosphere of 
ethnic tension.
1. The return of the native
I was born and raised in Czechoslovakia, graduated from the Charles 
University Law Faculty and left the Nazi occupied country in 1939 for the 
United States. I returned to Prague forty-three years later, in 1982 - by one 
of those baffling chances which defy explanation - unknowingly a day 
before the fiftieth reunion of my high school (gymnasium) class with fifteen 
of the 21 graduates attending. Their compelling stories took me through the 
Nazi occupation, the wartime, the brief return of the democratic Republic 
in 1945-1948, the communist take-over, the Stalin directed trials of leading 
communists in the early fifties, the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968 and the 
subsequent re-Stalinization after the Warsaw Pact invasion.
Of all the gymnasium graduates those who chose law fared worst. The 
most talented one, because he came from a long established bourgeois 
family of lawyers, ended up as a lowly clerk in a government corporation 
after a stint at a construction site. Another found refuge in the transportation 
department of the Prague general prosecutor’s office after returning, in 
1945, from a concentration camp. Still another made a meagre living as a 
‘black market’ purveyor of legal advice. A promising classics scholar was 
dismissed from his posts at the University and Academy because of his 
kinship to the Finance Minister in the First Republic; his mother took him 
as a young boy to the funeral of the Minister - the only connection with 
this relative. He ruined his eyesight working in a sandpit.
I returned once more in 1985 and left firmly determined never to come 
back to a country so grievously torn from its Western roots by a regime at 
that time no longer relying on physical torture or faith in an ideology but 
rather on a demoralizing combination of assurance of economic security and 
tight surveillance. Although almost everyone criticised the government in 
private there were few outward signs of dissent beyond reports of the 




























































































In the closing years of the old regime a handful of American lawyers 
established contact with Czech and Slovak dissidents and provided them 
with a variety of support. Professor Herman Schwartz of the American 
University in Washington D.C. went to Prague under the auspices of the 
Helsinki Watch to monitor the criminal trial of Vaclav Havel and wrote a 
brief on his behalf.
In an unexpected turn of events the same dissidents emerged as leading 
players in the post-revolutionary government. It was only natural for these 
leaders to suggest, building on the previous contacts, that the Americans 
provide assistance in the drafting of a new federal constitution by making 
available Western constitutional experiences from which the country had 
been cut off for forty years. In response to this suggestion, Lloyd Cutler, 
the quintessential Washington attorney, along with Schwartz, proceeded to 
organize a small international group of lawyers, judges, academics, and 
politicians from the United States, most of the Western federal states, 
France and the United Kingdom. I was asked to deal with foreign affairs 
aspects of the constitution because of my work in international law and 
European law.3 *5
2. The mode of operation
As the first step early in 1990, each member of the group was asked to 
write a paper on an aspect of the draft federal constitution prepared under 
the direction of the then Procurator General of the Czech Republic, 
Dr. Pavel Rychetsky, an intelligent and attractive major figure in the Civic
3 The financing was provided by Mr. and Mrs. Sid Bass and the Charter 77 Foundation 
of New York. The original group included among non-Americans, former Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada; Prof. Dr. Helmut Steinberger, Director of the Max 
Planck Institute for Foreign Public and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany; Prof. 
Vernon Bogdanor, Oxford; Prof. Francis Delperee, Catholic University, Louvain-la- 
Neuve, Belgium; Prof. Roger Errera, member of the Conseil d’Etat, Paris, France; Prof. 
Dr. Herbert Hausmaninger, University of Vienna; Prof. Gilles Petitpierre, University of 
Geneva, member of the Swiss Federal Parliament.
Working papers prepared by the following members of the group were published in 
Czech translation in the review Pravnik: H. Schwartz, Laurence H. Tribe, F. Delperee 
(issue no. 1 of 1991); Vicki C. Jackson (no. 2 of 1991); V. PSchota, Martin Garbus, 
A.E. Dick Howard (no. 4 of 1991); Albert J. Rosenthal, Charles Fried, Nigel Wright (no.




























































































Forum which spearheaded the ‘velvet’ revolution4 in the Czech Republic. 
With its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence, that movement 
emerged from the first free elections of June 1990 as the strongest political 
force in the Federation.
At that time Dr. Rychetsky became Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal 
Government in charge of federal legislation and relations with the 
legislative bodies. In 1970, Dr. Rychetsky was dismissed by the Communist 
regime from his assistantship at the Charles University Law Faculty in the 
course of the ‘normalization’ following the suppression of ‘the Prague 
Spring’ of 1968. Thereafter he worked as a lawyer with various 
organizations. He was one of the original signatories of Charter 77, and 
published samizdat materials opposing the regime.
Another prominent member in the Czech and Slovak group organized to 
work with the international counterpart was Dr. Zdenek Jicinsky, austere, 
somewhat melancholy, with a neatly trimmed goatee, Deputy Chairman of 
the Federal National Assembly - a former law professor, also a victim of 
the post-1968 ‘re-Stalinization’ After his expulsion from the Prague Law 
Faculty, Prof. Jicinsky, having refused a laborer’s job, was employed in an 
insurance organization, only to be dismissed again because of signing the 
Charter 77. He was expected to head the important committee of the 
Federal Assembly responsible for drafting the new constitution but was not 
reelected reputedly because of his prominent role in the drafting of the first 
federal constitution in 1968.
Finally, I should mention the Deputy Federal Prime Minister Dr. Jan 
Carnogursky, a Slovak lawyer who was disbarred under the old regime for 
criticizing the government while defending dissidents in court and was 
jailed for his organizing activities. It was Dr. Carnogursky who articulated 
the mission of our group in the first press conference: to provide a rational, 
impartial perspective as a necessary corrective in a tense and emotional 
atmosphere. I shall have a great deal more to say about Dr. Carnogursky 
who later in 1990 returned to his native Slovakia and, as the head of the 
Christian Democratic Party, became Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic.
The principal spokesman on the Slovak side turned out to be another law 
professor, the jovial Dr. Karol Plank, Chief Justice of the Slovak Supreme 
Court and Chairman of the Commission for the Preparation of the 
Constitution of the Slovak National Council (parliament). Additional 4
4 The first use of the term is attributed to Rita Klimova, at the time a translator for 





























































































political figures and academics from the Czech, Moravian and Slovak 
Universities and from the two Academies of Science participated in the 
group.
The two groups first met in April 1990 in Salzburg, Austria, at the 
baroque castle built in the eighteen-thirties by the ruling Archbishop 
Firmian; it now serves as the seat of the American Salzburg Seminar. After 
two days of meetings we all proceeded - under the benevolent command of 
the Czecho-Slovak Ambassador to the United States - by bus to Prague. At 
the frontier we saw the remnants of the barbed wire barriers. We were 
struck by the sharp contrast between the prosperous Austrian countryside 
and the run-down Czech villages.
The meetings continued in an estate outside Prague, originally built in the 
early fourteenth century by a Czech nobleman, Jan of Rokycany, held for 
a time by the Habsburg General Wallenstein, and presently owned and 
beautifully restored by the government. The haunting past that lurks 
pervasively near the surface emerged poignantly when Professor Jicinsky 
recalled that in the cellars of this very building the police of the old regime 
held and interrogated its political prisoners. Yet post-revolutionary euphoria 
and hope for the future was in the air.
After the first conference more papers were written and small meetings 
of specialists on basic rights, emergency presidential powers and the 
judiciary were arranged in Prague.
The international group returned to Prague in January 1991, the night 
before the unleashing of ‘Operation Desert Storm’. The government, press 
and, by all indications, the people were remarkably united in support of the 
Allied action: "A small country like ours can feel a bit less lonely on this 
planet" - a taxi driver told me. Alas, I thought, there is no oil in his land.
We met in the vast faculty room of the modernist building of the Law 
Faculty on the banks of the river Vltava, an inner sanctum I, as a student, 
had never dreamed to enter; at the Prime Minister’s building, a student 
dormitory in my time; in the cosy Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic 
with the Minister and members of the judiciary; and in the Hrzansky 
Palace, a delightful baroque structure in the romantic castle area, used for 
representative functions of the government. There, at the very entry visitors 
were faced with a large mural declaring "With the Soviet Union for eternal 
times."
In the Presidential wing of the Castle we were received by the 
Chancellor, "Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg, the chairman of the 




























































































pipe,"5 a picture of an Oxford don except for the elegant cowboy boots. A 
scion of an ancient Austro-Hungarian nobility which, however, was closely 
identified with the First Republic, he aided the Czech dissidents at some 
personal risk. When I mentioned that as a student at the Charles University 
I participated in a Roman Law seminar with a Schwarzenberg, he pointed 
to a photograph of his father.
The next encounter took place in June of 1991 at the request of Dr. 
Carnogursky, by then Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, in Bratislava, 
the capital of Slovakia, in an atmosphere of rising Slovak nationalist 
pressures. The town has a distinctly provincial, Eastern European 
atmosphere. The hotel, built as an exclusive abode of the party aristocracy 
with the Moscow idea of luxury, offered a breath-taking view across the 
Danube into Austrian countryside.
Before returning home I stopped in Prague. Ambling through the 
cavernous Cernin Palace, the seat of the Federal Foreign Ministry, I thought 
of Jan Masaryk, the last chief diplomat of the democratic Republic, who 
fell to his death from a window in this Palace in the wake of the 
Communist takeover. During my days in the Department of State I 
interviewed Masaryk’s personal physician, his novelist friend Marsha 
Davenport and others in an unsuccessful effort to clear up the mystery of 
his death.
By the time of this visit in early summer, 1991, the newly acquired 
freedom was taken for granted, the post-revolutionary good feeling had 
largely evaporated in the face of pervasive uncertainties. In the following 
months I have remained in contact with the constitution making authorities 
in Prague, principally on matters relating to foreign affairs and international 
law.
3. The lesson in self-knowledge
Henry James wrote: "There comes a time when one set of customs" - and 
I would add "one set of laws" - "wherever it may be found, grows to seem 
to you about as provincial as another; and then I suppose it may be said of 
you that you have become a cosmopolite."6
5 T. Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, 
Budapest, Berlin, and Prague at 118 (New York, Random House, 1990).




























































































Having been trained in two different legal systems, and after a lifetime 
of international activities, I thought of myself - more or less consciously - 
as a cosmopolite in Henry James’ sense. To my astonishment I found 
myself faced with not one, but with two strong biases that stood in the way 
of my understanding of Czecho-Slovak reality.
First, having been raised and trained under the first Czechoslovak 
Republic of 1918 I was subliminally unable to envisage an alternative to 
that unitary democratic system, the only one existing in my memory. In the 
June, 1991 meeting in Bratislava, the Slovak Prime Minister Carnogursky 
urged the constitution makers to ‘draw on the best’ from the experience in 
the East as well as in the West, and he made it quite clear that our group 
was expected to offer technical expert advice rather than political solutions. 
Quite inappropriately, in the presence of a Slovak TV crew, I found myself 
making an impassioned defense of the 1920 Constitution.
The second bias, of equally surprising intensity, was due to my 
identification with American life and law, and - more importantly - my 
deep conviction of the unique rationality of the Constitution of the United 
States. This stimulated misleading analogies. I was by no means alone in 
this quandary.7
It took several months of conscious effort and face-to-face exposure to 
the local environment to bring the double bias under a measure of control.
A closely related but separate factor was my indoctrination in American 
thinking about democratic federalism in general. The traditional discourse 
among constitutional lawyers, not only in the United States but in other 
mature federations, centers on an analysis of constitutional texts and 
problems arising from the ‘living law’ as it evolves from these texts. 
Political scientists dealing with federalism also often follow the formal, 
legal pattern. They assume the existence of given conditions that make a 
federalist system possible, desirable or indispensable and do not inquire into 
the nature of these conditions. They do not distinguish between conditions 
that make it possible for an existing federal system to continue functioning 
in the light of a changing environment, from conditions that make it 
possible for a new federal system to come into being in the first place. "The 
temptation is to make functional theories to do double duty as genetic 
theories."8 *
7 Reske, "U.S. Constitution Unpopular," ABA J’l. Dec. 1991 at 28-29.
8 Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy - Toward a Dynamic Model," 1970 Comparative




























































































It occurred to me after some time that the traditional approach to 
federalism must be reconsidered when it comes to a situation such as 
prevails in the Czech and Slovak state. In the next section I outline a 
conceptual framework that has helped me - after some trials and 
tribulations - to comprehend better the problems faced by the constitution- 
makers in that country, including the chances for transferability of foreign 
institutions into indigenous structures.
4. On asymmetric federation - and beyond9
In his ‘theoretical speculation’ on elements of federalism Tarlton 
distinguishes an ideal symmetric federal system in which the interests of the 
component units in relation to the center as well as to each other are 
identical, from an ‘ideal’ asymmetric system in which "each component unit 
would have about it a unique feature or set of features which would 
separate in important ways its interests from those of any other [component 
unit] or the system considered as a whole"10 (situation of "latent secession" 
or "secession potential"11).
The interests in question are predicated upon equality or disparity in the 
aggregate conditions of the respective units which may be grouped into 
environmental factors (size and location of the territory, climate, 
population), social factors (ethnic origin, language, religion, history, 
tradition, law, social groupings), and political factors (the political system).
system comes into existence and how an existing democracy can best be preserved.
9 See the innovative discussion in R. Dehousse, Fédéralisme et relations internationales 
96-100 (Bruxelles 1991). The Czechs and Slovaks mean by ‘asymmetric’ the fact that 
certain institutions set up in the process of federalization in Slovakia do not have a 
counterpart in the Czech Republic, e.g. the first autonomous organ under the 1948 
Constitution, the Slovak Academy of Sciences (there exist only the Czechoslovak 
Academy of Sciences in Prague), and - most important under the old regime, the 
‘asymmetric organization’ o f the Communist party.
10 Tarlton, "Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A  Theoretical 
Speculation," 1965 J’l o f Politics 861, 868. In such a system "it would be difficult (if 
not impossible) to discern interests that could be clearly considered mutual or national 
in scope (short of those pertaining to national existence per sé)". Ibid at 869. Citing 
Livingston, A  Note on the Nature of Federalism - Federalism as a Juridical Concept, 
LXVII Political Science Quarterly 80 (No. 1, 1952).




























































































One may conjure up a continuum between the two opposite ideal models 
in which the position of a given federal state would depend on the degree 
to which the interests of the units coincide or diverge. "[Hjarmony or 
conflict within a federal system can be thought of as a function of the 
symmetrical or asymmetrical pattern prevailing within the system." In 
general, ‘real’ federal states would be located on the continuum 
"somewhere between the complete harmony of the symmetrical model and 
complete conflict potential of the asymmetric model."12 The United States, 
the Federal Republic of Germany (particularly before unification), Austria 
and Australia may be viewed as relatively symmetrical systems as 
contrasted with the strongly asymmetrical former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia in the process of dissolution by secession. After secession a new 
unitary state, if it comprises strong disparate groups, may itself be a victim 
of its high level asymmetry (Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina).
An affinity with, or outright intervention by, a foreign state, or activities 
of emigre groups, may contribute to the corrosive effects of the asymmetry 
(Canada, Belgium, Yugoslavia, in some measure emigres from 
Czechoslovakia).
Although the United States, Austria, and Australia are multi-ethnic, their 
component states are not organized on an ethnic basis as are Canada and 
Belgium.13 The position on the continuum of the two last mentioned 
States, marked by strong asymmetric elements, is presently in question.
Two-unit states organized on the basis of ethnicity or religion (such as 
Lebanon14), the Czech and Slovak state and, in reality, Belgium15 pose
12 Tarlton, ibid. 871.
lj Kuzin, "The Confederal Search," Report on Eastern Europe 36, July 5, 1991. Kuzin 
considers Switzerland as essentially territorially rather than ethnically or nationality 
based. Spain constitutes "a blend of ethnic and administrative devolution." Ibid. 37.
14 Under the Constitution and the National Pact of 1943, as amended by the Taif 
Agreement of 1989, the President is a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunin 
Muslim, and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi’a Muslim. See generally T. 
Collelo (ed.), Lebanon: A  Country Study 144 (Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C., 1989); U.S. Dept, o f State, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1991, Rep. Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House 
of Rep. and the Comm, on For. Reis., U.S. Senate, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. p. 1485, Feb. 
1992.
15 The Belgium Constitution establishes in addition to the central and provincial 




























































































a special problem with pressures for absolute parity in representation, voting 
power and the consequent danger of blockage. Moreover, secession from 
a two-unit state has unique consequences: it means the end of the composite 
state.
Asymmetry implies diversity. In an atmosphere of tolerance diversity 
enriches and energizes the society. Intolerance and bigotry brings conflict 
within and among the component units. To endure, the constitution of a 
federal state must take account of the underlying conditions in an 
appropriate way.
Over time, a rising degree of asymmetry leads to increased devolution of 
powers from the center to the component units. One option is for the 
component units to share in central decision making, the other is to increase 
the scope of their independent action within their own sphere. The latter 
option has special consequences in the foreign affairs field, raising the 
problem of ‘external sovereignty’ and international personality.
Avoiding the concepts of ‘consociation’ or ‘international regime,’ 
political science artifacts of variable utility, the symmetric-asymmetric 
continuum may be described in traditional terminology: if devolution fails 
to satisfy the claims arising from asymmetry, the process may turn into a 
restructuring of the system into a ‘confederation,’ a loose composite in 
which the central authority derives from, and continues to be dependent 
upon, a consensus of the component ‘sovereign’ units which retain the right 
of secession. At a certain point, the status of the common structure as an 
international person may come into question. ‘Confederations’ have proved 
inherently unstable: they have either disintegrated or turned into more or 
less centralized federations as was the case with the United States, 
Switzerland and Germany. No ‘confederations’ in the above sense exist
regions, all with their own organs - a costly system of overlapping competences and 
Kafka-esque complexity. Belgium Constitution of Feb. 7, 1831 as amended, arts. 3bis, 
3ter., 107 quarter. Despite the radical decentralization, the normally marginal Vlaams 
Blok party moved from two to no less than twelve seats in the Parliament as a result of 
legislative elections of Nov. 24,1991 after a racist campaign, advocating an independent 
Flemish state. Europe, Brief Notes, Belgium, No. 1156, End of Dec. (sic!) 1991, 
Luxemburg. "Belgium has been fairly successful at taming Flemish nationalism by 
successive rounds of devolution" but this "method of containing communal conflict may 
reach its limits when the remaining central powers cannot be devolved without hurting 
one side or the other." The Economist, October 12-18, 1991, at 50-51. Cyprus may fall 




























































































today, although one or more may emerge from the ruins of the Soviet 
empire.16
Beyond the confederation format is a variety of more or less loose 
functional, regional and global associations such as the European 
Community,17 Benelux, the British Commonwealth, the new 
Commonwealth of Independent Republics of the former Soviet Union, and 
the numerous intergovernmental international organizations.
II. The Asymmetry of the Czech and Slovak State
On April 20,1990, after two full days of debate, the Federal Assembly (the 
federal parliament) adopted the country’s new name, the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, discarding, under Slovak pressure, the name 
(Czechoslovak Federal Republic or in the Slovak version, Czecho-Slovak 
Federal Republic) adopted just one month earlier. The ‘hyphen debate’ 
almost led to a constitutional crisis18 and the ultimate decision was 
supported by a majority of four.
The 1960 Constitution19 amended in 1968 remains still in force although 
heavily amended by a series of post-communist constitutional laws.20 It 
called for a federal scheme embracing two component units, the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic. The federal aspect proved at best an 
administrative division, at worst a hollow sham, but it led to a dramatic 
increase of Slovaks in the bureaucracy. The task faced by the current
16 See generally P. King, Federalism and Federation at 133-145 (Croom Helm, London 
& Canberra, 1982).
17 The European Community today is a sui generis body marked by high-level 
economic, monetary, social and legal integration and a low-level, incipient political 
integration, a hybrid between a confederate and federal structure.
18 Obrman and Pehe, "Difficult Power-sharing Talks," Report on Eastern Europe, 5 at 
6, Dec. 7, 1990. The hyphenated name Czecho-Slovakia evokes a bitter memory for the 
Czechs; it was used briefly during the German occupation and before the establishment 
of the secessionist Slovak state in 1940.
19 Constitution of July 11, 1960, 100/1960 Sb., translated in Constitutions of the 
Countries of the World (A.P. Blaustein and G.H. Flanz eds.) (Czechoslovakia by G.H. 
Flanz; out o f print; 1974.)




























































































constitution makers has been in effect to build a new structure responding 
to the new aspirations.
That task, however, must proceed in the context of conditions which, I 
shall assume, in the aggregate, define the interests of the two component 
Republics with respect to each other and to the common system as a whole. 
They determine the position of the common state on the continuum of 
asymmetry described earlier.
1. Environmental conditions: geography, demography, ethnicity, economy
The country, the size of the state of New York, is located in the center of 
the Continent, a bridge - according to conventional wisdom - between East 
and West. Jan Masaryk, the son of Czechoslovakia’s first President, 
complained that, as with any bridge, everyone feels free to trample over it; 
and it can also be easily blown up.21 The precarious geographic position 
at the crossroad of major powers has obvious security implications that 
must be taken into account in policies if not in the institutional structures 
of the country.
Approximately ten and a half million people live in the Czech Republic; 
in addition to the Czech speaking majority, Moravians and Silesians who 
speak a slightly different dialect live in the East and North East of the 
Republic.22 *Five and a half million live in the Slovak Republic. The total 
population of sixteen million is substantially less than that of New York 
State.
The Czechs and Slovaks are of the same ethnic, Slavic origin. However, 
in Slovakia there are 600,000 Hungarians (some estimates are as high as 
750,000) settled predominantly along the border with Hungary, 70,000 
Poles, and some 60,000 Ukrainians and Ruthinians. Throughout the country 
there are 60,000 to 100,000 Germans, a remnant of the three million 
expelled by the Czechs at the end of the Second World War, some 800,000 
Roma or gypsies, mostly in urban areas and in eastern Slovakia, some 
remaining Vietnamese (originally 40,000 in number), gently pushed out to
21 V. Fischi, Hovory s Janem Masarykem 40 (Mladâ Fronta, Praha, 1991); H. Brandon, 
Special Relationships 23 (New York, Atheneum 1988; Obrman, Minorities Not a Major 
Issue Yet, Report on Eastern Europe 9 at 50, Dec. 13, 1991.





























































































Austria, and more recently some hundreds of refugees from Romania.23 
The gypsies, many well assimilated with representatives in the legislatures, 
nevertheless account for a disproportionate part of certain crimes in the 
context of a dramatic rise of criminality after the November 1989 
revolution.24
In summary, one third of the people in Slovakia and one tenth of the 
entire country are minorities, a "birth defect"25 due to the post-World War 
I settlement which was greatly alleviated but not remedied by the mass 
expulsion of the Germans. Thus the two-to-one demographic asymmetry is 
greatly complicated by the still extant minority problem.
In 1918, the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia) contained 
two-thirds of the entire industrial plant of the Austro-Hungarian empire, 
while Slovakia was much less developed. A great deal has been done 
particularly in the last 20 years to put the Slovak and Czech economies on 
an equal footing with the result that the living standards between the two 
Republics today are similar. Nevertheless, Slovakia remains the more rural, 
still federally subsidized area. The major part of important industries is 
located in the Czech Republic,26 while the Slovaks are left with obsolete 
armament and heavy industrial establishments, substantially more vulnerable 
in the process of transition to the free market. The asymmetry in economic 
development, although greatly reduced, persists - and at any rate is 
perceived to persist, a consideration which - from a rational viewpoint - 
should influence the negotiations on the future shape of the common state.
23 The above data are based substantially on Brian Hunter (ed.), Statesman’s Yearbook 
408-409, 127th ed. 1990-91 (St. Martin’s Press, New York 1990); World Almanac and 
Book of Facts 1990, 703 (Pharos Books, New York, 1990). It is widely believed in the 
West that official census data have underestimated significantly minority numbers. On 
a possible reason, see Tribe, Draft Paper on Federalism issues for Consideration by the 
Framers of the Czechoslovakian Constitution 40 (unpublished).
24 In 1990 crimes rose by 78% in the Czech Republic and by 48% in the Slovak 
Republic as compared with 1989. Pehe, "Crime Rises in Czechoslovakia," RFE/RL 
Research Report 55, Apr. 3, 1992.
25 "The hardest struggles in a democracy are those against the birth defects of the 
political community." Rustow, supra n. 8 at 360.





























































































2. Social conditions: history, culture, religion
The history of the two peoples differs greatly. Until the end of World 
War I, the Czechs, Moravians and Silesians lived in the Austrian-German 
sphere of the dual empire with a measure of political autonomy which 
allowed for the development of an authentic national culture and political 
consciousness; the Slovaks were under the oppressive rule of the Magyars 
(Hungarians) for a thousand years with the result that in 1918 the peasant 
society lacked any upper or middle class, intelligentsia or culture of its 
own.27 In 1939, after two decades of coexistence with the Czechs, the 
Slovaks broke away from the Czechoslovak Republic and established their 
own fascist puppet state in a deal with Nazi Germany. The head, a Catholic 
priest, was hanged after the war as a war criminal. In 1991 the Czechs were 
incensed when some Slovak nationalist groups memorialized him as a 
hero.28
History plays perhaps even a more vital role in Central Europe than in 
the western part of the Continent. Despite seven decades of a common 
political system (interrupted only in 1939-1945 by the defection of the 
Slovak State) the asymmetry in historical memory continues to stalk private 
and public life. "[A] shared forgetfulness is at least as important as common 
memories of a shared past for the emergence of a nation."29
Considerable divergence exists in religious orientation as well, although 
a substantial majority of both Czechs and Slovaks are Catholic. While the 
Slovak (and Moravian) church wields considerable influence in the 
Polish-conservative mode, the Czech Catholicism is of a more liberal hue, 
suspected by the Slovaks of secularity and humanism. Protestant minorities 
exist in both Republics.
27 Kusin, "Czechs and Slovaks: The Road to the Current Debate," Rep. on Eastern 
Europe 4 at 7, Oct. 5, 1990. On history, see A.H. Hermann, A  History of the Czechs 
(Allen & Lane, London, 1975); A. Lettrich, History of Modem Slovakia (Praeger, New  
York, 1955); E. Tâborskÿ, Czechoslovak Democracy at Work (G. Allen & Unwin 1945); 
R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (Hutchinson & Co., London, 
New York, Melbourne, 1943).
28 Kusin, Ibid.
29 Renan, Qu’c ’est-qu’une Nation (1882) cited by Majone in M. Tushnet (ed.), 





























































































A distinct language is generally viewed as a dominant characteristic of 
a nation. Yet there is very little difference between the Czech and Slovak 
language: broadcasts alternate in Czech and Slovak, and with my Czech 
background, I have no difficulty reading or understanding Slovak.
"What is the Slovak nation?" asked a distinguished scholar of Charles 
University with a twinkle in his eyes. "They have no distinct language, no 
hero, no myth, no literature, not even a saint."30 Intended as a bon mot, the 
statement is an evident hyperbole. There is in Slovakia today a layer of 
intelligentsia and talented artists, although much thinner than in the Czech 
lands. Czech cultural life was revived and has flourished since the third 
quarter of the last century, although it was profoundly impaired by the 
German occupation and the communist regime. Nevertheless, the private 
remark illustrates the attitude prevailing among the Czechs of all classes. 
It is a heritage of the early, almost colonial relationship and actual or 
perceived discrimination as it evolved after 1918 when Czech teachers, 
officials and entrepreneurs moved to Slovakia to help establish an 
indigenous system of education, economy and administration. Masaryk’s 
idea of a single political (not cultural) nation in the image of modern West 
European states, essential as it was in 1918, became - it is said - 
erroneously interpreted to apply in a cultural and ethnic sense as well.31 
The benign view of the relationship between the two peoples taken by the 
respected scholar Milan Simecka is that the Slovaks have no hate for the 
Czechs but a permanent sense of being number two,32 Which, I may add, 
the Czechs feel, in the depth of their hearts, is true.33 *This psychological
30 Private conversation, January 1990.
31 Varossova and Pitha, "Vedomi narodni, vedomi statu," Lite rami Noviny, Sept. 6, 
1990, at 3, Prague.
32 At the end of the First World War leading Slovak personalities opposed Slovak 
autonomy because the people had "neither a national nor human consciousness'1 and they 
called for strong centralism: the autonomous movement evolved from the conflict 
between the governing Slovak protestants supporting unity and the opposition Slovak 
catholics whom the ‘progressionist-socialists’ kept from jobs, also from economic 
discontent as well as from the ‘nationalist’ friction between the Czechs and Slovaks. F. 
Peroutka, Zacatky Cesko—Slovenskeho Souziti 33-34, 88-89 (Edition Sokolova, Paris, 
1953?).
33 Opinion polls in spring 1991 showed that only 9% of all Slovaks favored
independence. 21% were for a ‘confederation’ and 43% for a federation but the polls did




























































































factor has fed the Slovak aspiration for recognition of their national identity, 
the most visible symptom of the asymmetry of the system and the dominant 
Slovak goal in the negotiations for a constitutional compact, overshadowing 
all other considerations.
3. Political conditions
For this generation of Czechs and Slovaks, except for the very old ones, the 
democratic experience in the First Republic of the nineteen twenties and 
thirties is a distant, if not subliminal, memory. The long term impact of 
Nazi occupation and the Stalinist modernization is still not fully revealed.
The democratic institutions of the 1920 Constitution based on a tripartite 
division of powers, respect for individual rights, rule of law, pluralism and 
market economy were destroyed. They were replaced by ‘democratic 
centralism,’ a hierarchy of public power organs with the people’s assembly 
at the summit, and all subject to the ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party. 
The federal framework introduced in 1968 under Slovak nationalist pressure 
as a dialectic reconciliation of the opposites of unity and diversity34 did 
little to alleviate centralized policy making and party control on all levels 
of government.35 A formidable security establishment guarded the regime 
against any opposition; it is estimated that one out of ten people cooperated 
in one role or another. To maximize the monopoly of the party, the regime 
did all it could to atomize the society - "to destroy the institutions and 
bonds of solidarity and loyalty that hold society together as a society" and 
"to prevent the types of social, political and economic interactions that 
could promote individual and group autonomy."36
Slovak Demands Seen as Threat to Federation," Report on Eastern Europe 1 at 2, Mar. 
22, 1991.
34 For a socialist perspective, see Knapp, "Socialist Federation - A  Legal Means to the 
Solution of the Nationality Problem: A  Comparative Study," 82 Mich.L.Rev. 1213, 
1215-16 (1984).
35 Kuzin speaks of "concealed unitarism, a unitary federalism of the one-party state 
entailing administrative regionalism with all policy making functions centralized and 
upheld by the ubiquity of the party." "The Confederal Search," supra n. 13 at 38.
36 Schopflin, "Post-communism: constructing new democracies in Central Europe," 67 




























































































Socialization of property - or - in Havel’s terms, its anonymization 
("everything is owned by all, in reality by no one"37) was pressed in 
Czechoslovakia further than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, particularly as 
part of the post-1968 ‘normalization’. The end effect was the drowning of 
individual responsibility and initiative in a labyrinth of bureaucracy, 
indifference or hostility to the state and its property, with, on the other 
hand, the expectation that the state would guarantee jobs, housing, what the 
Chinese call the ‘iron rice bowl’. Pervasive negative egalitarianism frowned 
on individual success and there was no tradition in risk-taking.
The political system of the First Republic (1918-1939) was in the image 
of the Western European democracies. It was dominated by the interaction 
of five principal parties ranging from the moderately nationalist right to the 
social democratic left with a well entrenched communist party in 
opposition. The President, although limited in terms of legal authority, 
exerted considerable influence. This party system, already distorted in 1945, 
was destroyed after 1948 by the communist take-over: the parties were 
reduced to discredited shells in a sham ‘National Front’.
The political forces emerging from the 1989 revolution in both the Czech 
and Slovak Republics were quite different and did not divide along the 
political spectrum38 of the First Republic parties. The Civic Forum in the 
Czech Republic and its Slovak counterpart, Public against Violence, which 
I mentioned earlier, were conglomerate political movements embracing a 
variety of different, even contradictory currents, held together 
predominantly by non-material considerations. By their very nature they 
were destined to fragmentation, symptoms of which became manifest 
shortly after the first election.39 *
37 "Znovu vybudovat stat," Lidove Noviny, June 30, 1991, at 1.
38 See generally on Central and Eastern Europe, Schopflin, supra n. 36 at 237. On the 
outcome of the first election of June 1990, see "Now Govern," The Economist, 16-22 
June 1990, p. 53-54. The Civic Forum and Public Against Violence received nationally 
46.6%, Communists 13.6%, Christian Democrats 12%, Moravian and Silesian 
Autonomists 5.4%, Slovak National Party 3.5% (11% in Slovakia), coalitions of other 
minorities 2.8% (8.6% in Slovakia), and others 16.1%.





























































































This was the political setting in which the Federal Assembly and the 
National Councils (parliaments) of the two Republics appointed their 
committees charged with the revision of their respective constitutions.40
III. On Transferability of Institutions
Implicit in the mission of our group to provide information on Western 
constitutional experience was the question of the transferability of such 
experience. This brought to mind Montesquieu, ‘the first of all comparative 
lawyers’. I realized that the categories of conditions listed in the preceding 
section in connection with the symmetric-asymmetric models coincide 
essentially with those distilled by Kahn-Freund from Montesquieu’s 
categories applicable to the transferability of legal rules and institutions 
from one legal order to another.
Kahn-Freund envisages a continuum of transferability: the degree of 
transferability of a given institution - and its place on the continuum - is in 
inverse relationship to its closeness to the local- habitat, which in turn is 
determined by the aggregate categories of conditions enumerated above. 
The closer an institution is linked to the local conditions the less 
transferable it is and more prone to ‘rejection’ in case of an attempted 
transfer. Successful legal transplantation, Montesquieu warned, is "un 
grand-hazard", a great coincidence which cannot by any means be taken for 
granted.41
Still, according to Kahn-Freund, the environmental and social factors 
have lost in importance in the 200 years since Montesquieu’s time because 
of the assimilation of the social structures set in motion by industrialization, 
urbanization and communications; the political factors on the other hand 
have greatly gained as obstacles to transplantation because of political 
differentiation: communist as against non-communist governments, 
dictatorship as against democracy, presidential as against parliamentary 
systems.42 Since the constitutional choices with which we are concerned 
in this essay are closest to the political conditions (the political system), the
40 Infra text after note 100.
41 Esprit des Lois, Book I, Chap. 3, cited in Kahn-Freund, "On Uses and Misuses of 
Comparative Law," Chorley Lecture, London School of Economics, 37 Modem L. Rev. 





























































































assumption is, if we follow Kahn-Freund, that the transferability of rules 
and institutions would be particularly difficult in that field. Yet can it be 
that, with the waning of the communist regimes and increasing assimilation 
toward more democratic systems not only in Eastern Europe but in the 
Third World as well,43 the impact of political conditions may be 
decreasing?
This raises the question of the continuing role of environmental and 
socio-cultural factors as perhaps the predominant obstacles to transferability 
of foreign rules or institutions when it comes to drawing up constitutional 
documents. On one hand there is the danger that a foreign transplant will 
be ‘rejected’ as dysfunctional because incompatible with local conditions; 
but on the other hand ignorance of foreign patterns and a romantic, 
parochial conception of the specificity of local conditions may prevent 
functional transfers and produce naive ‘novelties’.44
IV. Four Threshold Issues
1. The scope and flexibility of the Constitution
A constitution being the highest in the hierarchy of norms, a crucial 
question facing a constitution maker is how much of the country’s law 
should be given constitutional status and - as a corollary - what should be 
the modality of modifying it. Dahrendorf illustrates the dilemma:
Whatever is raised to [the constitutional] plane is thereby removed horn day-to-day 
struggle o f normal politics...a line is drawn between rules and principles which must
43 "As of late 1991, there are more than 110 governments, almost all represented in the 
United Nations, that are legally committed to permitting open, multiparty, secret ballot 
elections with a universal franchise. Most joined the trend in the past five years." 
Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," 86 A.J.I.L. 46 at 47 (1992), 
citing i.a. U.S. Dept, of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990. 
However, in a number of states, old and new, elections have brought to power old 
leadership or aspiring dictators.
44 See generally, Stein, "Uses, Misuses - and Non-Uses of Comparative Law," 72 




























































































be binding on all, and differences of view which can be fought out within these 
rules.45
President Havel told the Federal Assembly that, in his opinion,
Our future constitutions should be utterly clear, simple and basic to the extent that 
our successors would not have to modify them each year by ever new constitutional 
laws and additions.46
In our first series of meetings in Salzburg and Prague, American 
participants recounted the experience with the sparse federal constitution 
and its difficult amending procedure47 which accords the States an 
important voice along with Congress: a possibility of frequent amendments, 
James Madison argued, would promote factionalism and provide no firm 
basis for republican self-government.48 *In support of the proposition that 
more than approval by the federal legislature is necessary, the Americans 
quoted Madison:
[T]he Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of 
America...this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals 
composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent states to 
which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several 
states, derived from the supreme authority in each state, - the authority o f the people
45 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe 36-37 (Random House, New  
York, 1990).
46 "Znovu vybudovat stat," Lidove Noviny, June 30, 1990, 1 at 3.
47 The U.S. Constitution has 7 articles (the most detailed, art. I, has ten sections, art. II 
has eight sections), art. 5, amending procedures, requires two-thirds of both Houses of 
Congress or two-thirds of state legislatures calling a convention whose decisions require 
ratification in three-fourths of the states. There have been X X W  amendments to the 
Constitution.
48 James Madison, "Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 14, 1790)," reprinted in Marvin
Meyers, ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources o f the Political Thought of James
Madison 230-31 (Bobbs-Merril, 1973) cited by Sunstein, "Constitutionalism and
Secession," 58 Chi.L.R. 633 at 636, n. 12 (No. 2, spring 1991). Jefferson on the other
hand thought that the constitution should be amended by each generation in order to 




























































































themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution will not be a national but
a federal act.49
Although the Belgian and The Netherlands’ constitutions may be 
amended by no more than a special procedure in the legislature, in most 
unitary European democracies a constitutional amendment, after approval 
by the legislature or constitutional convention, is submitted either 
automatically, or on request of a minority in the legislature, to ratification 
by a vote of all the people. This practice prevails, for instance, in France, 
Italy, Spain and Sweden.50
As for federal states, only in Germany may an amendment be adopted by 
a two-thirds majority of both houses of the federal legislature. In other 
divided-power states a referendum is either optional (Austria) or obligatory 
(Switzerland), or the approval of a specified majority of legislatures of the 
component units is necessary, following action by the federal legislature 
(Austria, Brazil, Canada and India in most matters, Mexico, United 
States).51
A Canadian member of the group advocated a simple, short document 
with special, demanding requirements for any amendment. He cited the 15 
regimes or constitutions in the past 200 years of French history as a 
deterrent. Some of the European members of the group were reticent on this 
subject. Yet it soon became clear that the answers lay elsewhere.
The first Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920, fashioned after the Charter 
of the French Third Republic, had 124 articles,52 the 1960-68 
Constitution53 had 151, the Civic Forum draft 160, President Havel’s
49 Federalist Papers, No. 39, (Mentor Books, The New American Library of World 
Literature) 243 (1961).
50 France: art. 89 of the Constitution of 1958. Italy: arts. 138, 139 of the 1947 
Constitution. Spain: arts. 166-169 of the 1978 Constitution. Sweden: art. 15 of the 1975 
Constitution.
51 Germany: Grundgesetz (Basic Law) art. 79, 146 (on new constitutions); Austria: art. 
44 of the 1929 Constitution; Switzerland: art. 118-123 of the Constitution; Canada: art. 
38-49 Const. Act. of 1867; United States, see supra n. 47. India: Part XXI art. 368. 
Mexico: art. 135. Brazil: art. 60; Australia: art. 128.
52 The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of June 9, 1948, 150/1948 Sb., 
translated in Constitutions of Nations 689 (A.J. Peaslee ed., 2d ed., 1956), also published 
by Czechoslovak Ministry of Information, transi, by F.O. Stein (Orbis, Prague, 1948).




























































































original draft 180, the Czech Republic working draft 195. For a 
constitutional amendment, the 1968 Constitution requires - in addition to an 
absolute three fifths’ majority in the lower chamber - a three fifths’ 
majority of the Czech and Slovak National groups in the upper chamber of 
the Federal Assembly.54
It became quite clear to us that as regards the scope of the Constitution, 
the Czechs and Slovaks will follow their own tradition which they share 
with most other states and which mirrors the turbulent history of the 
European Continent marked by frequent violent changes. For one thing, 
although basic decisions are made by politicians, constitution making is "the 
hour of lawyers"55 and the lawyers’ way is paved with precedents. More 
importantly, the lack of trust on the part of the Slovaks fuels the tendency 
to spell out in detail the laboriously achieved consensus, far in excess of the 
minimum scaffolding of basic rights and institutions deemed necessary for 
a system based on constitutionalism and democracy. Finally, in the present 
circumstances individual constitution makers are in no better position than 
anyone else to foresee the future role they and the groups they represent 
will be able to play in the still unformed political system. This uncertainty 
is an added motive for including matters that would normally be left to the 
political process. Moreover, unlike the United States, the Czechoslovak 
tradition follows the Continental pattern in that it does not rely on the 
construction of constitutional documents as the principal method of adapting 
them to changed requirements of the society. As one Czech expressed it, 
the United States Constitution can not serve as a model because the general 
conditions at the time of its drafting "were much simpler"; in view of the 
need to accommodate the power claims of the two Republics the new 
Constitution must be more detailed and flexible. As for the call for Havel’s 
"utter clarity", it is endemic to contentious negotiations such as those 
between the Czechs and Slovaks that a consensus is often reached only at 
the price of ambiguity.56
Evidently, with respect to both the content of the constitution and its 
flexibility, environmental factors (demographic asymmetry, legal tradition,
54 See art. 41 of the 1968 Constitution retained in the full amended text 103/1991 Sb. 
To similar effect, Aug. 1991 fed. Draft, Chap. 4, art. 12(3), variant I.
55 Dahrendorf, supra n. 45 at 86.
56 See e.g. art. 6 of the Constitutional Law of Jan. 9, 1991, instituting the Charter of 





























































































history), as well as political conditions (individual and group attitudes and 
interests and the political system) prevail over both President Havel’s voice 
and foreign advice.
It appeared equally probable at the time of our early meetings that the 
precedent of an amendment procedure not requiring separate ratification by 
the two Republic Parliaments would likewise be continued, regardless of 
what appears to be the trend in modern European constitutions. In short 
order, however, this expectation has proved unwarranted, due to unforeseen 
developments which I shall elucidate later on.
*  *  *
A variety of thoughts came to me as we were driving from the meeting 
through the gray streets of Prague in a steady, slow, early spring drizzle - 
a ‘female rain’ in Navajo parlance. The United States Constitution - the 
historian Gordon S. Wood told me once - broke down after seventy years, 
as did the Soviet Union’s; is there magic in the number 70? The ominous 
constitutional crisis in the 1930ies depression time was due in large part to 
the glaringly obsolete allocation of powers between the federation and the 
States in the federal Constitution. Applying the outdated Constitution, the 
Supreme Court struck down vital social and economic federal legislation. 
Why did the President choose the controversial - and ultimately disastrous - 
attempt at ‘packing the court’ rather than the natural course of invoking the 
amending procedure? Although assured of the necessary support for an 
amendment in Congress, was he concerned that the effort to obtain approval 
in three-fourths of the State legislatures was too aleatory or, perhaps more 
likely, too time-consuming to meet the demands of the day? In the end, the 
Court, with its membership changed through normal attrition, upheld the 
broadest federal power by an interpretation of the commerce clause which - 
in the minds of Continental jurists - amounted to "une expansion 
démesurée," "susceptible of englobing any aspect whatever of state 
activity."57 In fact, eventually even federal civil rights legislation was ruled 
constitutional on the basis of the commerce clause.58
57 R. Dehousse, Fédéralisme et Relations internationales, supra n. 9 at 23.




























































































2. Constitution as a symbol
The differences in the perception of the constitution go to its function in the 
society as well. In the United States, the Americans pointed out, people 
freely criticize the President, Congress, the Supreme Court, they even bum 
the flag but not (at any rate since the end of the Civil War) the 
Constitution, a unifying symbol of the country. The economic interpretation 
of the Constitution, advanced by some historians who view it as an artifact 
designed to maximize national interests of the property-holding class, may 
have affected ‘the public philosophy’, but it has not diminished the broad 
attachment to that document; most Americans remain convinced with Prime 
Minister Gladstone that the Constitution is "the most wonderful work ever 
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."59 One may 
say that the country is held together "not by common ancestry or ethnic ties 
and memories, but by the Constitution and a related system of beliefs."
The German federal Basic Law of 1948 has been the foundation of 
‘constitutional patriotism’ which, over the last four decades, has superseded 
- one would hope - the mischievous features of a nationalist ideology.
The Czechoslovak liberal, pluralist tradition had its origin in the 
Constitution of 1920.60 That charter, however, was turned into a scrap of 
paper after only nineteen years when the President, acting under duress but 
nevertheless in flagrant disregard of the Constitution, surrendered the 
country to Germany.
The brief effort to restore the constitutional tradition after the Second 
World War ended in a communist takeover and the President’s resignation 
due to his refusal to sign the communist-influenced 1948 Constitution.61 
That Constitution in fact was not applied. The 1960-68 Constitution, a 
communist creation in the Soviet image, became again in most respects a 
scrap of paper. History has not allowed the Czechs and Slovaks to develop 
a lasting sense of loyalty to, and identification with, the fundamental 
document. The problem is, a Slovak judge sighed, how to make the new 
constitution a document people will view "as their own".
50 P. Smith, The Shaping of America: A  People’s History of the Young Republic, vol. 
3, 94 (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1980).
60 English translation, the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak republic, 179 Int’l. 
Conciliation (Oct. 1922).




























































































Since hope springs eternal one must trust that, in this instance, past is not 
prologue and a new Constitution will endure where its predecessors have 
failed. Of all the environmental factors, the geography of the country 
located between the German and Russian empires has been the determinant 
condition of its constitutional history. That condition, alas, persists, even 
though the spots of the leopard may have changed.
3. On secession and referendum
The third threshold issue of existential weight - it so appeared at any rate 
in the early stage of constitution writing - was whether the new constitution 
should specifically recognize the right of the two component Republics to 
secede from the common state.
To the amazement of the entire international group, the Civic Forum 
draft, and for that matter all the subsequent drafts that have come to our 
attention, contained a text affirming that right in one form or another.62 
This despite the fact that President Havel told the Parliament that he saw 
no purpose in grounding the right to secede in the new Constitution.63 For 
Americans, a secession clause signified the very opposite of the ‘perpetual 
union’ contemplated by Madison and affirmed by Lincoln who declared that 
"[N]o government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own 
termination."64 *
In his study on Constitutionalism and Secession, Professor Sunstein 
concludes:
To place such a right [to secede] in a founding document would increase the risks of 
ethnic and factional struggle; reduce the prospects for compromise and deliberation 
in government; raise dramatically the stakes of day-to-day political decisions; 
introduce irrelevant and illegitimate considerations into those decisions; create
62 Civic Forum Draft, 1 Feb. 1990, Sec. 5(2); the 1990 federal draft art. 3(3); the Slovak 
Rep. working draft Chap. 5, art. 2(2); on the Aug. 1991 federal draft, see infra text at 
n. 72.
63 Quoted in Z. Jidinsky, "Problemy dvoudlenne federace," Lidove Noviny, Oct. 25, 
1990, no. 198.
64 First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,1861), reprinted in T. Harry Williams (ed.), Selected
Writings and Speeches of Abraham Lincoln 117 (Packard and Company 1943) ("Lincoln 
Writings"). The Supreme Court has made it clear that a state o f the Union has no right
to secede since its acceptance of the federal Constitution constituted a waiver of that




























































































dangers o f blackmail, strategic behavior, and exploitation; and, most generally, 
endanger the prospects for long-term self-governance. Constitutionalism, embodying 
as it does a set o f precommitment strategies, is frequently directed against risks of 
precisely this sort. Political or moral claims for secession are frequently powerful, but 
they do not justify constitutional recognition of a secession right...In Eastern Europe, 
where strong nationalist passions persist and threaten to infect daily politics if given 
an explicit constitutional home, a right to secede would be especially damaging to the 
prospects for democratic government. All this suggests a strong presumption against 
a constitutional right to secede.65
In the light of subsequent developments this eloquent exhortation evokes 
sentiments of nostalgia. Yet, in what seems a contradiction, Sunstein adds 
that "under certain conditions" (he mentions Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union 
and - prophetically - Czechoslovakia) the inclusion of a secession clause 
may serve as an incentive to join in the first place with "few deleterious 
effects" and "may prevent serious harms."66
In our first series of meetings, the international group argued 
emphatically against a secession clause: there is no such clause in the 1968 
Constitution67 and no existing federal constitution contains any such 
provision, the U.S.S.R. Constitution (for particular historical reasons), being 
the only exception.68 * Even subfederal, functional entities such as the 
United Nations or the European Community do not sanction withdrawal.
The reaction to our arguments on the Slovak side was one of surprise: to 
them this was a non-issue, a closed matter beyond debate. The Czech 
members responded with an air of resignation: that course was the only way 
- "a calvary," "a route through Balkanization" - toward a new - and, one 
would hope, lasting - relationship. The Czechs, it was said, wanted
65 Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 Chicago L.R. 633, 634-35, 654 (No. 
2, Spring 1991).
66 Ibid, at 654.
6' But the preamble speaks of the "inalienable right of self-determination even to the 
point o f separation."
68 The Soviet constitutions referred to the 1922 treaty in which the right to secede was 
recognized; it was intended by Lenin as an inducement particularly for the Asian
Republics to join the Union. See generally, Ludwikowski, "Searching for a New
Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe," 17 Syracuse Int’l & Comp. L. 91 at 
104ff (1991). On the efforts to read a right of secession into the Yugoslav Federal
Constituiton, see Bagwell, "Yugoslavian Constitutional Questions: Self-determination and 




























































































marriage, the Slovaks a contract. Some of us felt that the idea of providing 
for dissolution in order to avoid it was a paradox worthy of HaSek,69 
Kafka - and the playwright of the absurd, Vaclav Havel. Yet - as the reality 
unfolded - it became apparent that the issue was indeed foreclosed.
Instead, the debate turned on the conditions under which the 
constitutional right of secession could be invoked and the complex problem 
of ‘fair compensation’ in case of a secession. Federal states have state 
assets and liabilities including transportation and communication systems, 
cash and bank deposits, foreign exchange reserves, armed forces, physical 
facilities of all kinds, domestic and foreign debts, rights and obligations 
under domestic contracts and international agreements and memberships in 
regional and international organizations that would have to be 
apportioned.70 With one exception, to which I shall return, the various 
drafts relegated this particular thicket to later constitutional legislation or 
popular vote.71
The complexity of the secession problem is accentuated by the unique 
situation in a two-member federation such as the Czech and Slovak state: 
unlike in a multi-member entity, a secession in this situation means the end 
of the federal state with direct consequences in international law and 
relations. Curiously, none of the authors writing on the subject of secession 
took notice of this factor.
In the end, urged on by President Havel, the Federal Assembly, in July 
1991, adopted a constitutional law72 which makes possible a referendum 
on basic constitutional issues and, specifically, on any proposal for a 
secession advanced by one or the other Republic. The subsequent federal 
draft would expand the scope of the referendum and move a step further in 
regulating the consequences of a separation. In that contingency, it would 
require a division of federally-owned realty according to its location, and 
it would allocate reserves and other movables to the Republics according
69 HaSek is the creator of the immortal good soldier Svejk, the bane of the 
Astro-Hungarian imperial bureaucracy and army.
70 Lloyd N. Cutler, "The Dilemma of Secession," The Washington Post, July 21, 1991, 
p. C7.
71 C.F. draft Sec. 5(2); Slovak Rep. working draft Chap. 1, art. 7(2); the limited 
exception is the 1991 federal draft.




























































































to their respective populations.73 In the event of an all-state vote to 
terminate the federation, both Republics would become fully sovereign 
states, but nothing is said about the succession into treaties and other 
international obligations assumed by the Federation. If only one of the 
Republics voted to secede, the international personality of the federal state 
and its membership in international organizations would pass to the other 
Republic ‘which did not decide’ to secede.
If it is next to unprecedented to provide for a secession in a national 
constitution it is even more extraordinary to clothe its consequences with 
a constitutional mantle. Yet once an opportunity for a division is offered, 
it may prove unavoidable to agree in advance on the modalities as well - 
and in view of the absence of trust - to entrench the agreement in the 
Constitution.
I shall return to the controversy surrounding President Havel’s proposals 
for a referendum on the continuation of the common state in the broader 
context of the subsequent negotiations between the Czechs and the Slovaks. 
Suffice it to say that under the present state of the law a secession would 
be constitutional if accomplished in conformity with the July 1991 law. The 
question whether or not to invoke a constitutional right of secession 
evidently becomes one of policy and morality. Since vocal groups in 
Slovakia advocate independence, one might speculate whether a secession 
in the present situation could be justified by some general standard.
In contrast to the abundance of writings on revolution, civil disobedience 
- and self-determination - there appears to be very little on a normative 
theory of secession.74 Buchanan postulates two categories of justification: 
first, injustice based on a historical grievance or discriminatory distribution 
and second, the distinctive conception of a community or a particular 
conception of the religious life.75
If by historical grievance is meant a wrong at the creation of the common 
state, then this justification would clearly not apply since, in 1918, the 
handful of Slovak leaders who participated in the revolution against the 
Austro-Hungarian empire worked closely with the Czechs and, in view of
73 Fed. draft of Aug. 1991, Third Part, Second variant, art. 8.
74 A. Buchanan, "Toward a Theory of Secession," 101 Ethics 322 at 323 (Jan. 1991). 
He cites Lea Brihnayer, Harry Beran, Richard Arheson, William A. Galston and Bruce 
Ackerman. See also Sunstein, supra note 48 at 643ff. See Brilmayer, "Secession and 





























































































the conditions in Slovakia at the time, had little, if any, option other than 
joining in the common state.76 It has been said, however, with some 
justification, that after the founding of the unitary Republic, Presidents 
Masaryk and BeneS construed the idea of a Czechoslovak nation not as a 
way toward gradual integration of two distinct nationalities in a common 
structure but as a denial of their national differences.77
In answer to a Slovak claim of discriminatory distribution, the Czechs 
point to major and sustained subsidies of the Slovak economy from Czech 
resources. The Slovaks on the other hand, question the budgetary data on 
the ground that the Czechs draw an unfair advantage from the impact of the 
taxation system since most of the Slovak products - raw material and semi­
finished goods - are taxed for the added value in the Czech Republic.78 
Until late 1991 the debate was singularly devoid of any relevant data, on 
the Czech side perhaps because of the desire to avoid adding to the tension, 
on the Slovak side because of the predominance of emotion.
The assertion of ‘a distinctive conception of a community’ has been the 
principal Slovak motivation in the constitutional negotiations. It could, I 
assume, be supported by the evolving, albeit still ambiguous, principle or 
right of self-determination since the Slovaks and Czechs may be considered 
as separate ‘peoples’ living in distinct territories. The unresolved question 
is how to reconcile the right of self-determination with the well established 
rights of a state to territorial integrity in case of a unilaterally asserted claim 
to secession in disregard of the constitution.79 *I wonder, in any case,
76 See F. Peroutka, supra n. 32.
77 K. Adamova, "K dalsimu vyzkumu ceske statnosti," 130 PrSvmk 160 at 161 (no. 2, 
1991).
78 In the 1991 Federal Budget the Czech Republic carried 93%, the Slovak Republic 7% 
of federal expenditures. By the population key the Slovak contribution should be 33%. 
Public Lecture by the Ambassador of the Czech and Slovak Republic, R. Klimova, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, Apr. 6, 1992.
79 Buchanan, supra n. 74 at 328-29; Brillmayer, "Consent, Contract, and Territory," 74
Minn.L.Rev. 1 (1989-1990). How does one reconcile the right o f "selfdetermination of 
peoples" (U.N. Charter art. 1, art. 55, Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
1 (1)) with the right of a sovereign state to its territorial integrity (U.N. Charter art. 2(4), 
Helsinki Final Act and other documents)? When it comes to a definition of "people," the 
scholarly discussion inevitably runs in the sand. See e.g. Cutler, "The 
Internationalization of Human Rights," 1990 U. 111. L. Rev. 575 at 589-591; Cassese in 
T. Buergenthal (ed.), Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord 83 at 




























































































whether - despite the demographic and historic asymmetries mentioned 
earlier, and leaving aside the very relevant considerations of the viability 
and risks of a separate Slovak state80 - such an assertion can serve as a 
justified ground for termination of the common state.
4. Constitution and society
The underlying theme of the discussion in our meetings was the 
fundamental issue of the nature of the new society and state. The question 
was posed to the Czechs and Slovaks: now that you have eliminated one 
ideology what will you put in its place?
The answer was articulated again by President Havel in his address to the 
Federal Parliament:
"No official ideology or political doctrine even if  it were a thousand times superior 
to the ideology of the system we have overthrown. The foundations of the state and 
its entire policy should be inspired by a single basic idea. That is the idea of respect 
of the unique human being, recognition of human rights in the broadest sense, 
including social and economic rights, and respect for environmental, material and 
cultural legacy of our forebears"... modem democratic state o f democratic pluralism 
balancing "mutual relationships of legislative, executive and judicial power" and a 
new balance "between local self-administration and state administration...on all levels 
and in all societal areas...changing totalitarian centralized anti-economy to normally 
functioning market economy..."81
Yet, I asked myself, can the new state of Havel’s image be sustained by 
a society left in the wake of the old regime? Earlier in this essay I 
speculated on the continuing impact of the totalitarian regime "which
claim and threat of secession in disregard of the constitution. For an analysis showing 
that self-determination has not been interpreted to include the right o f secession, see 
Morphet, "Article 1 o f the Human Rights Covenants: Its Development and Current 
Significance" in D. M. Hill (ed.), Human Rights and Foreign Policy 67 at 83-86 (1989). 
See also Emerson, "Self-Determination," 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 459 at 464 (1971); 
Thomberry, "Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A  Review of International 
Instruments," 38 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 867 (1989); on self-Determination generally, see 
Thiirer, "Self-determination" in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Instal. 8, 470 (North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam-New York, 1985).
80 Martin, "Slovakia, Calculating the Cost of Independence," RFE/RL Research Rep., 
Mar. 20, 1992.




























































































succeeded in a mere forty years to disrupt the fragile gossamer 
of...relationships that had been formed by experiences of entire 
generations."82
Only gradually, and with mounting dismay, have I apprehended the 
"giant discrepancy between the institutions of the wished-for political 
democracy and the state of the civil society" which was forced into "an 
oriental mode."83
Democracy, still according to Havel, is:
more than a mere compound of systemic arrangements, formal rules o f the game or 
mere organizational tricks...[It is] an outward expression of something very internal 
that no generation of computers or political science discoveries is able to fashion. 
Democracy is an artifact of a human being who has internalized his or her inalienable 
human rights and human responsibility and who respects human rights and believes 
in human responsibility of others.84
Democracy, Schopflin would add, demands self-limitation, bargaining and 
compromise which the post-communist societies cannot be expected to 
acquire overnight, for they can only result from years of practice.85
Havel felt that the germs of basic freedoms and pluralism have latently 
persisted in the society and in fact they quickly surfaced during the first 
free election campaign. Returning to Prague in 1991,1 had the feeling that 
such freedoms had already become a matter of course to be taken for 
granted, even though the brief post-revolutionary identification of the people 
with the new government has again reverted to the ‘we and they’ attitude 
toward the politicians.86
However, the transformation of the economy’s basic structure with the 
consequent serious hardships of a transition has posed an unprecedented 
challenge to the political process generally and, of course, to the 
constitution-makers. They have been faced with the task of writing a basic 
document for a society greatly different from Havel’s vision and to do so
82 Havel, supra n. 37.
83 Toth cited in Kulcâr, "Pravnf kultura, Pravnf Stât a Rule of Law," etc., 130 Pravnfk 
193 at 203 (1991).
84 Havel, supra n. 37 at 1.
85 Schopflin, supra n. 36 at 236.




























































































at a time when the new society is at best only dimly discernible. At an 
early stage, the negotiations for a new constitution, difficult as they turned 
out to be owing to the asymmetries discussed earlier became complicated 
by disagreements over the economic reform process. The work of the 
Czechs and Slovaks has been perhaps more demanding than that undertaken 
by the founding fathers of the United States or even by the founders of the 
new democracies built on the ruins of the dictatorships at the end of the 
Second World War.
V. A Federation?
1. Federalism as an improvisation: an interlude
On democracy and republicanism the Founding Fathers of the American 
Republic could mine rich European thought. As regards federalism, 
however, unlike their Czech and Slovak counterparts who have had laid 
before them extensive Western theory and practice, the eighteenth century 
Americans had no working models to turn to, and, in drafting the Articles 
of Confederation, they showed little concern for the theoretical dimension 
of the task.87 Federalism "was an improvisation which was later promoted 
into a political theory."88
Until 1937, the enumerated federal powers were construed as limited to 
specific subject matters as is presently contemplated for a Czech and Slovak 
constitution. Thereafter, however, the division between federal and state 
power was held to depend not on subject matter but - except for a 
short-lived doctrine of protection of states’ rights based on structural 
requirements of state autonomy89 *- on the working of the federal political 
process only. As a result, Congress’s power over the national economy has 
been for all practical purposes viewed as plenary, subject to political 
constraints only; with the changes in membership of the Supreme Court,
87 Rakove, "The First Phases of American Federalism," in M. Tushnet (ed.), supra n. 29 
at 4.
88 Roche, "The Founding Fathers: A  Reform Caucus in Action," 55 Am.Pol.Sci.Rev. 799 
at 804 (1961).
89 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) expressly overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See L. 




























































































however, the new majority may restore the earlier limited exception - and 
thus ‘the improvisation’ continues.
Historically, Americans have thought of federalism primarily as a form 
of separation of power along the vertical axis, that is in the negative sense, 
as a form of government designed to inhibit concentration of power at the 
center. This appears to be also the goal of the Czech and Slovak 
constitution makers who favor a common state. For them, however, 
federalism has the additional positive function of enabling the two peoples 
to live together despite the conditions of asymmetry.
2. On theory of constitution-making
To test the ongoing process of making a Czech and Slovak constitution 
against a general theory, I would need sufficient empirical data that at this 
time are not available to me, or for that matter to anyone else. Nevertheless, 
as I shall illustrate, my response would be that a theory based on an 
analysis of the bargaining process in a contractual setting would be most 
germane in the given situation.90
The dominant issue - the contraposition of interests between the Czech 
and Slovak sides appears simpler than was, for instance, the division in 
1787 Philadelphia between the Northern and Southern states and between 
the large and small states. The parties, the ‘Federation’ and the two 
Republics, speaking through the agents of their respective governments and 
parliaments, as is the case in any contractual negotiations, bring to the 
discussions a mixture of complementary and opposed interests on the entire 
spectrum of issues in question. There are, of course, not only institutional 
but also personal and group interests of the individual elite actors. For this, 
if not for other reasons one may think here of bilateral negotiations for a 
contract, not in the sense of classic, primordial social contract theorists such 
as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, but as strategic bargaining over the 
allocation of expected benefits and costs focussed "on the actual conditions 
on which real contracts are negotiated,"91 and leading to an agreement
90 I rely here primarily on Heckathom and Maser, "Bargaining and Constitutional 
Contracts," 31 Am.J’1 Polit.Science 142 (no. 1, 1987); Jillson and Eubanks, "The 
Political Structure of Constitution Making: The Federal Convention of 1787," 28 Am.JT. 
Polit. Science 435 (1984); J. Buchanan, the Limits of Liberty (Chicago Univ. Press, 
Chicago, 1975).




























































































ultimately embodied in the constitution. The bargaining techniques range 
from appeals to common good, ethical and rationalist principles, to efforts 
to squeeze concessions out of the other side while offering only minimal 
concessions and finally warnings and threats.92
The appealing contractual analogy, however, must not be allowed to 
conceal the specificity of the situation where a dispute goes to the very 
existence of a political community and may ultimately not be susceptible 
to settlement by "split[ting] the difference."93 A minimum sense of 
commonality is a prerequisite background condition for the success of any 
negotiating process.
3. The setting
At one of our early meetings in the spring of 1990, a Canadian member 
addressed the Czechs and Slovaks with a threshold proposition, which on 
its face was quite obvious, and with a question, which was shortly to turn 
out to be of fundamental importance. The proposition was that the 
international group sees itself in a position of advisor and expects the client 
to pose the issues; and the question was: "Do you want a common state 
composed of one nation or of two nations?" The Swiss member recalled his 
country’s concept of one nation with four ‘nationalities’.
Yet both the proposition and the existential question received short shrift 
at that juncture because the entire international group, with the Americans 
at the forefront, unanimously pleaded for a strong federation - a posture 
taken previously in the papers prepared for the meeting: only a federation 
with sufficient power at the center would be able to accomplish the 
unprecedented restructuring of the economy internally and, externally, the 
integration of the country into the European and international political and 
economic systems. Internally, a federation, to be viable, must have a 
mechanism for avoiding and dissolving blockages in the political process. 
In the international arena, it must speak with a single voice. If the two 
Republics are to play a role in foreign affairs, they must do so in full 
conformity with the federally set foreign policy as is the case in Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland, and the scope of their authority, the federal
92 Ibid at 159. See also Elster, "Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction," 
58 Chi.L.Rev. 447 at 449 (No. 2, 1991).




























































































control and international responsibility must be clearly defined for the 
benefit of the foreign partners.94
A leading staff member of the Commission of the European Community 
joined us in Bratislava to reinforce our view. He explained that any 
composite state which aspires to membership in the Community must show 
that the central authority is strong enough to ensure full and prompt 
compliance with Community legislation and judgements of the Community 
judiciary throughout the territory of the common state.95
We were taken aback by the intensity of the negative response to this 
plea not only on the part of the Slovaks (we should have expected that), but 
by some - though by no means all - on the Czech side as well. The prime 
target of a Czech academic was the communist-controlled federal 
bureaucracy, ‘seventeen ministries with some 2000 staff each’, the 
embodiment and the bane of mischievous centralization. For the Slovaks 
Prague was dominant not only because it was ‘Czech’ - and thus by 
definition in conflict with Slovak national aspirations - but also because it 
was the center of communist power.96 (The fact that some of the most 
powerful actors at the center were Slovak communists was mentioned in 
private conversation only.)
The drafters of the Articles of Confederation of the United States reacted 
similarly against the overbearing monarch and his minions in America when 
they reached the fatal decision to dispense altogether with any central 
executive power, an error remedied in the Federal Constitution. 
Constitutions, it seems, are written with an eye on - and against - the past 
that is known rather than on the future that is a mystery.
After our meetings in Bratislava in June 1991, the chairman of the 
Slovak National Council (Parliament) Jozef ProkeS expressed his "immense 
disappointment" over the activity of our group: "We view it" - he declared 
in Bratislava - "as an effort to support a certain wing in the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic which seeks a strong central power and the idea 
of a single Czecho-Slovak nation...the foreign participants proceed from 
erroneous assumptions when they compare Czecho-Slovakia as a federation 
with Germany, Austria and the United States. They forget that these
94 Stein, "Zahraniéni véci v moderni ustavè," 130 Pràvnik 33 and 576 (1991). This paper 
was prepared for the meetings with the Czech and Slovak authorities.
95 Director General Claus-Dieter Ehlermann quoted in Nàrodnà Obroda, Bratislava, 24 
June 1991, p. 1.




























































































countries are one-nation federations and their central organs act abroad in 
the name of that nation. In Czecho-Slovakia, however, live two different 
nations and one of them is being denied the right to speak in its own name. 
The Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic should be compared to Canada with 
all the consequences flowing from it."97
4. Actors and process
a. Principal institutions
The power to amend the Constitution of the Czech and Slovak Federative 
Republic or to adopt a new Constitution is vested in the Federal Assembly. 
That body consists of the Chamber of the People, composed of 150 deputies 
elected directly throughout the entire country; and of the Chamber of 
Nations of 150 members, half of whom are elected directly from the Czech 
Republic and half from the Slovak Republic.98 A new constitution or a 
constitutional amendment (in the form of a so-called ‘constitutional law’) 
requires approval by a three fifth’s majority of all deputies in the Chamber 
of the People as well as the consent by three fifths of all deputies in both 
halves of the Chamber of Nations.99
As in other parliamentary systems, executive power is divided between 
the federal government and the President (the ‘dual executive’ system). The 
federal government holds most of the executive power of the Federation. 
The President’s legal powers are limited, but, following the tradition of 
strong personalities in the First Republic, his political influence is 
considerable.100 The Republics have their own directly elected 
parliaments, ‘the National Councils’, as well as Governments.101
97 Narodna Obroda, supra n. 95. Another deputy of the Slovak National Council was 
critical of the current federation; he saw the federation as a process through which 
Czecho-Slovakia as two nation-republics enters into a community and at the same time 
this community differentiates itself. Ibid.
98 Const. Law 103/1991, Sbfrka zakonu Ceske a Slovenske Federativnf Republiky (Sb.), 
arts. 29-31, consolidated text and containing a complete version of Const. Law 143/1968 
as amended through Jan. 9, 1991.
99 Ibid. art. 41.
100 On the President’s powers ibid. art. 61. On the Federal Government, ibid. arts. 66-85.




























































































The ‘Présidia’ of the Federal Assembly and of the two National Councils 
are entrusted with significant functions.102
The responsibility for carrying forward the constitution making process 
has been in the hands of the leading political personalities: the President, 
the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the three parliamentary and executive 
organs and - last but not least - the leaders of the political parties 
represented in the three governments. The roles of the individuals and of 
the institutions, however, have varied greatly in the successive phases of the 
negotiations.
b. The process
The original idea, closest to the Czech perception, was for the federal 
Constitution to be drafted first, with the Republic constitutions to follow. 
The Federal Assembly established a ‘Committee of Deputies for the 
Preparation of a Proposal for a New Constitution’ (Committee of Deputies) 
composed of 14 members of the Federal Assembly (seven Czechs, seven 
Slovaks) and ten deputies each from the two Republic National Councils, 
reflecting the entire political spectrum. The chairmen and other members 
of the Présidia of the three legislatures were included. The chairmen of the 
three legislatures alternate in presiding over the sessions.103
To assist the Committee of Deputies, the presidium of the Federal 
Assembly appointed a Committee of Experts - again on a parity basis - 
composed of eighteen members selected on the basis of their special 
knowledge or experience. A majority was drawn from university law 
faculties, but federal and Republic deputies and officials were also 
included.104
102 Ibid. arts. 32(3), 33(2), 45(3), 49(3), 51, 52, 54, 56-59 (on the Federal Presidium); 
Art. 104(2)-(3), 111(3), 116(3), 119-122 (on Presidia of the two National Councils).
103 At the time of the creation of the Committee of Deputies, the Chairman o f the 
Federal Assembly was A. Dubcek (Slovak), the Chairman of the Czech National Council 
was D. Buresova, and the Chairman of the Slovak National Council was F. MikloSko.
104 The original chairman, Prof. Dr. Marian Posluch, formerly a member of the Federal 
Assembly from Slovakia, head chair of constitutional law at the Komenskeho University 
in Bratislava, and Slovak Minister o f Justice, was appointed to the Federal Constitutional 
Court on Jan. 31, 1992. The deputy chairman is Prof. Dr. Jifi Boguszak, advisor at the 
Office of the Federal Government and presently again member of the Charles University 




























































































In the course of 1991, for example, the plenary Committee of Experts 
met not less than eleven times in one day sessions, but twice for an entire 
week. As a rule, working drafts, texts of foreign constitutions, literature and 
specialized studies are circulated in advance of the meetings. The 
proceeding centers usually on a chapter of the constitution, and the 
discussion results in a draft containing several variants and sub-variants. 
This text is submitted with an explanatory report to the Committee of 
Deputies, which returns it with its comments and suggestions for 
modification and additions. Special questions are dealt with by groups of 
more limited membership drawn from the Committee of Experts, some 
delegated to elaborate a concrete variant.
During the same year, the plenary Committee of Deputies met only five 
times, always with the participation of the chairman or deputy chairman of 
the Committee of Experts; as a rule a representative of the President’s 
Chancery is also in attendance. The deputies discuss the materials submitted 
by the experts.
In November 1991, a part of the Committee of Deputies working with 
some experts produced a formal proposal for the revision of the federal 
executive and legislative institutions, which was subsequently submitted by 
fourteen deputies to the Federal Assembly;105 it met again twice in 
January 1992 to consider a modified text worked out by a group drawn 
from the Committee of Experts.106 The explanatory report attached to the 
original proposal is replete with references to constitutions of Western 
European states, indicating that the experts, in drafting specific provisions, 
took into account not only the existing and prior Czechoslovak 
constitutional texts but also the most recent constitutions of Greece, Spain 
and Portugal, as well as the German, Italian, Dutch, Austrian, French and - 
marginally - United States constitutions.
Surprisingly, in the extensive federal apparatus in Prague there is no 
Ministry of Justice that would prepare or coordinate the preparation of legal 
texts. To fill the gap, the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of legislation 
organized a Legislative Council and a number of working groups drawn 
from personnel of various ministries and outside experts to assist not only 
in constitution-writing but also in drafting extensive revisions of the codes 
and new federal legislation. Only in 1991 was a special institution for 
legislation established within the office of the Prime Minister.





























































































Like the Federal Assembly, each of the Republic National Councils 
established its own constitutional committees. A draft of a Slovak Republic 
Constitution was prepared under the leadership of Professor Karol Plank, 
President of the Slovak Supreme Court with some forty collaborators in - 
it is said - a month’s time. A Czech text, allegedly kept secret, also 
surfaced, albeit in an incomplete form.
Although the membership of the federal and Republic committees 
overlaps to a certain extent, there have been no meetings or formal contacts 
between these committees on a tripartite basis. Any consultations that have 
taken place have occurred only inside political parties most of which are 
organized on both the Czech and Slovak side at the federal and Republic 
levels. President Havel deplored the inadequate cooperation and - with a 
view to assuring coherence among the three constitutional charters - asked 
the three legislatures to establish ‘a small group of the best Czech and 
Slovak brains’ to prepare a draft federal text in close cooperation with the 
drafters of the Republic Constitutions.107 In the changing political 
atmosphere the President’s call was ignored. Even though the June 1990 
elections confirmed the Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart Public 
Against Violence as the strongest groups in their respective lands, the rising 
Slovak nationalism had a direct impact on the constitutional discourse.
VI. The Negotiations
1. The first phase
The ‘hyphen war’ in the Federal Assembly over the new name of the 
country was the culmination of the initial round of the Slovak struggle for 
new powers.108 A termination of the common state surfaced as an actual 
option in a strident exchange between Czech and Slovak intellectuals which 
appeared in two leading periodicals.109 With several thousand Slovaks
107 "Znovu vybudovat stat," Lidove Noviny, June 30, 1991, 1 at 2.
108 The hyphen in question appeared in the name of the Czecho-Slovak Federal 
Republic, which was changed after a bitter debate to Czech and Slovak Federative 
Republic. Obrman and Pehe, "Difficult Power-sharing Talks," Report on Eastern Europe, 
Dec. 7, 1990, at 5, 6, 8; throughout this section I draw on this article and also on 
Martin, Relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks, ibid. Sept. 7, 1990, at 1-6.




























































































demonstrating in Bratislava for independence, Dr. Jan Carnogursky, then a 
federal Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Christian Democratic Party, 
at the time the second largest political group in Slovakia, spoke for the first 
time of the gradual dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation with a view 
to a separate entry of the two states into the European Community.110
On the Czech side it was the Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart who 
signalled a reversal in the constitution making process: it will now be for 
the two Republican governments to produce a list of those powers the 
Republics are willing to cede to the federation.111
Although allocation of powers emerged as the central issue, the 
Committee of Deputies in principle avoided it, expecting the National 
Councils of the Republics to produce a common stand. It was said that the 
Committee served mainly as a sounding board "for the monologues of the 
different political factions." The President, having lost patience, submitted 
his own draft of the complete new constitution but no one seemed to take 
note of it.
As early as in summer 1990, it became clear that the Slovaks were not 
prepared to wait for the solution of the power distribution issue until 
consensus was reached on the entire new constitution. It was therefore 
agreed to settle the issue promptly by preparing a separate constitutional 
law, to be effective, as the Slovaks demanded, on January 1,1991. That law 
would amend the division of powers in the existing 1968 federal 
Constitution,112 *pending adoption of the new constitution. At the same 
time, at the urging of the federal Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Rychetsky, a 
deadline was set for the adoption of the federal constitution and the 
Republic constitutions, one year and two years respectively from the date 
of the June 1990 elections. I might mention parenthetically that - after some
110 Pehe, "Growing Slovak Demands Seen as Threat to Federation," 2 Report on Eastern 
Europe, no. 12, May 23, 1991, 1 at 2 and passim. The Slovak National Party, the only 
group with a parliamentary representation advocating independence polled about 12% 
of votes in the first federal election and 14% in the election to the Slovak parliament in 
June 1990. A  number of small Slovak parties and groups organized before or in the 
wake of the elections took a similar stance. Other intellectual and social groups agitated 
for separation, assisted by Slovak émigrés. Kusin, "Czechs and Slovaks: The Road to 
the Current Debate," Report on Eastern Europe, Oct. 5, 1990, 4 at 5.
111 Obrman and Pehe, Dec. 7, 1990, supra n. 108 at 6.
112 Const. Law 143/1968 Sb., translated in Constitutions of the Countries of the World




























































































internal sparring within the Civic Forum - a corresponding decision was 
taken to proceed similarly by a special constitutional law with the 
formulation of a Bill of Rights, an undertaking that proved surprisingly 
successful and relatively uncontroversial.113
2. The second phase
The negotiations for a constitutional law on the new division of powers was 
undertaken in the first instance by members of the federal and Republics’ 
governments in a series of talks held behind closed doors - partly with the 
participation of the President - between August and mid-November of 1990.
In the first round on August 9, the three governments’ representatives, 
meeting in the Slovak spa TrenCianske Teplice, agreed on a list of federal 
powers in the form of a series of guidelines that were to be developed into 
a draft proposal by ten tripartite expert commissions. The multiple 
commissions hastily produced reports of variable length and quality, leaving 
a number of gaps; and an effort by a ‘free working group’ to consolidate 
the conclusions did not prove successful.114 Shortly after the August 
meeting, the Slovak government created its own Ministry of International 
Relations although foreign policy was listed in the guidelines as falling 
within federal competence, and the President urged a single federal Foreign 
Affairs Ministry.115 *It is said that the President was not given advance 
notice.
Little has been made public about another round of talks in September 
and October of 1990, first in Prague and then in the Moravian town of 
Kromenz, this time in the presence of the President himself. The
113 Const. Law 23/1991 Sb., instituting the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms.
114 Zprava svobodne pracovnf skupiny o vysledcich prace komisi, ustanovenych na 
zdkladS jednarn pfedstavitelu vlad CR, SR a CSFR v TrenCianskych Teplicich ve dne 
8. a 9. srpna 1990, prfloha II, RozhodnutI hospodarske rady vlady CSFR (undated). 
The attempt to classify all the imaginable competences in much greater detail than 
either the 1968 Constitution or the early Civic Forum draft into the categories of 
exclusive federal, exclusive Republican and shared federal-Republic competences 
appeared particularly illusory.
115 Obrman and Pehe, Dec. 7, 1990, supra n. 108 at 6-7. Not until almost two years later





























































































participants, it is reported, reaffirmed the guiding principles accepted at 
Trencianske Teplice and the deadline for the new reallocation of powers.
In a declaration adopted on the anniversary of the birth of the first 
Czechoslovak Republic the President and the three Prime Ministers 
condemned all attempts to destabilize Czechoslovakia and pledged to 
continue the federation.116 Finally, on November 5, the three Prime 
Ministers, meeting again in Prague, approved a draft of a constitutional 
amendment paralleling, with a few exceptions, the previous guidelines. The 
draft was ready for submission to the respective governments and 
legislatures.
The governments of the two Republics gave their approval of the draft 
in the following two days; but the federal government, although agreeing 
‘in principle’, insisted on certain modifications, since in its view some of 
the provisions adversely affected the working of the federal authorities. In 
response, the Slovak Prime Minister Mediar warned of an impending ‘deep 
crisis’. The ensuing ‘emergency negotiations’ among the three governments 
in Modra near Bratislava, included this time the leaders of the two major 
groups, the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence, but the talks 
proved inconclusive. Finally, another meeting held in Prague on November 
13 produced an agreement, which was completed on November 28 in 
another encounter among the three Prime Ministers, on the subject of 
federal and Republic budgets. The approved text, however, failed to deal 
with a number of important points, such as the authority over the national 
transportation system, which had proved beyond the reach of a consensus 
and were left to be regulated in the new constitution or in special 
legislation.
Following its acceptance by the three governments the constitutional bill 
came before the legislatures of the two Republics and the Federal 
Assembly.117 It received quick approval in the Slovak National Council, 
but this time it was the Czech National Council that decided to propose 
several substantial changes, as did the committee of the Federal Assembly 
on taking up the text.118
116 Rude Pravo, Oct. 29, 1990 cited in Obrman and Pehe, ibid, at 7.
117 In this part I rely primarily on Pehe, "Power-sharing Law Approved by Federal 
Assembly," Report on Eastern Europe 6, Dec. 21, 1990, at 6-9.
118 The Czech National Council proposed i.a. that the federation be responsible for 
issues of nationality and minority rights because these were covered by international 




























































































The Slovak leaders, who apparently had assumed that the approval by the 
three executive branches precluded any further modification, were reported 
to have threatened in private conversations to declare supremacy of 
legislation passed by the Slovak National Council over federal laws. 
(Shades of John C. Calhoun who in the eighteen-twenties claimed the same 
right for his state of South Carolina against federal law under the doctrine 
of nullification.119) In response, the Czech Prime Minister warned against 
such a ‘grave and irreversible step’ against the federation and adumbrated 
that his government had several possible courses of action in case of a 
constitutional crisis. The Slovak Prime Minister Meciar, while denying 
having made the threat, hinted at a secret Slovak plan that would be 
employed if the Federal Assembly should change the agreed text, but at the 
same time he affirmed Slovakia’s continuing interest in the common state. 
Furthermore, by attacking prominent Czech politicians, as well as the 
federal Prime Minister, a Slovak, for not paying sufficient heed to 
Slovakia’s economic needs, he injected a new issue into the controversy, 
and in doing so he disclosed the growing rift between the two presumed 
allied groups, the Czech Civic Forum and the Slovak Public Against 
Violence, the latter having come out emphatically in support of the Slovak 
position against any change in the power-allocation agreement.
On December 9, President Havel re-entered the scene by pointing out 
first that Meciar and others did not understand the separate roles of the 
legislative and executive branches: that the three governments had reached 
an agreement did not mean that the federal legislature must approve it 
without changes. He warned that pressure on the legislature may ‘break up 
the federation’.120 He followed up next day with a dramatic speech before 
the Federal Assembly in which he pictured the grave economic and political 
consequences of the country’s break-up and charged Mediar and other 
Slovaks with fueling the crisis: while recent opinion polls showed a 
majority of Czechs and Slovaks supporting the federal state, most of the
annual alternation of governorship of the Central Bank between a Czech and a Slovak 
be dropped and the subject be regulated by internal rules o f the central bank; and finally 
that a different method be adopted for generating income of the federation and the 
Republics. Ibid, at 7. Eventually, the Federal Assembly accepted the first proposed 
modification. Ibid, at 8.
119 B. Bailyn et al., The Great Republic 588 (Little Brown & Co., Boston-Toronto, 
1977).




























































































respondents viewed the power-sharing conflict as ‘a high stake gamble by 
some leading politicians’. The President proposed prompt establishment of 
a constitutional court, a law on referendum and an unspecified temporary 
broadening of the President’s power.
Most of the Czech political forces supported the President’s proposals; 
Slovak leaders, although favoring the first two, opposed the last one and the 
Assembly decided to table them all until the power-allocation bill had been 
dealt with. Both Meciar and the Chairman of the Slovak National Council, 
Miklosko, thought Havel’s statement one-sided and unfair to Slovakia, but 
they sought to de-dramatize the situation. In response to mixed reactions to 
his speech, the President said he believed his intervention defused the crisis 
and he left on an official visit abroad.
More than 70 deputies participated in the Assembly debate, proposing 
some 30 changes most of which were voted down. Of the several 
modifications proposed by the Czech National Council, the Assembly 
accepted the one designed to retain federal legislative jurisdiction over 
nationality and minority issues as well as over churches.121
Responding to the appeal of its leaders to have reason prevail "over 
prestige-seeking, unitarism, and separation,"122 the Assembly on 
December 12 adopted the bill by 237 to 24 votes with 17 abstentions.123 
The public reaction to the Assembly’s action was generally favorable as 
clearing the way for critical parliamentary business that had been slowed 
down, if not blocked, by the festering power-allocation controversy.
The optimistic expectations, however, proved short lived. The Czechs 
assumed that the adoption of the ‘new concept’ of the common state as 
deriving its powers and its continuing existence from the ‘sovereign 
republics’ would satisfy the Slovak national aspiration. Yet even before the 
Assembly debate, Slovak Prime Minister Mediar hinted that the new 
concept should be embodied in a ‘state treaty’ between the two Republics, 
thus opening a new phase in the conflict. By definition, the law was 
provisional in the sense that it was to form a part of the future new 
constitution.
121 The Assembly also voted to keep control over distribution of energy in cases of 
emergencies. Pehe, supra n. 117 at 9.
122 Chairman of the Assembly Alexandr Dubcek, CTK Dec. 11, 1990, ibid, at 9.




























































































3. The new allocation-of-powers law of 1990 
a. ‘Front the top’ or ‘from below’?
It makes at least a doctrinal and symbolic difference whether the power 
allocation is structured in the context of an extant common state by 
devolution from the central authority to component units (from the top - 
shora in the Czech parlance); or whether independent states create a new 
structure by accepting a common constitution (from below - zrfo/a).124 
The Czechs contend that the current process of constitution making can be 
nothing else but a devolution, considering the inescapable fact of the 
existing federation and its history. The Slovaks, insisting on the ‘from 
below’ method, point out that federations built ‘from the top’ have 
historically fared much worse (Yugoslavia, Belgium, Canada) than those 
built ‘from below’ (the United States, Germany, Switzerland). The late 
Soviet Union - the Slovaks might argue - although built on a treaty 
preceding the constitution was in reality formed ‘from the top’. According 
to the terminology used in the Czech and Slovak discourse, the choice is 
between a ‘federation’ and a ‘confederation’, assuming, of course, the 
continuation of the common state. The real issue is the nature and extent 
of the powers conferred on the central authority that determine the viability 
of the common state in given historic conditions.
This controversy became the central issue in the subsequent negotiating 
phase over the Slovak-proposed ‘treaty’. Suffice it to say here that on its 
face at any rate the December 1990 law does not resolve the issue. That 
law has now been included in the new consolidated version of the 1968 
Constitution containing all the amendments adopted thus far. It incorporates 
(with minimal omissions of the ritualistic invocations of socialism and 
proletarian internationalism) the preamble and the ‘basic provisions’ of that
124 Rychllk, "Federace budovana’zdola’ ci ’shora’"?, Lidove Noviny, Jan. 14, 1992, at 
9; Krecht, "Federativnf stat a jeho pravnl system (Studie zamerena k ustavni 
problematice)" 130 Pravnfk 721 (No. 9-10, 1991). Krecht’s interesting study, strongly 
influenced by normative positivism, postulates a ‘treaty’ between sovereign states as 
preceding the constitution in a ‘from below’ building of a common state. There was no 
such treaty preceding the Confederation in the United States, only a Declaration of 
Independence. And there is a question whether the thirteen colonies were ever fully 
‘independent states’. See generally on the Czech-Slovak controversy, Kalensky and 
Wagner, "Sebeurceni narodfi a suverenita v diskusi o stfitopravnim usporadam," Lidova 




























































































Constitution: a ringing affirmation of the virtues of the common state and 
of the single internal market is coupled with an equally eloquent assertion 
of the right of the two Republics to self-determination "up to separation" 
and no less than eight references to their sovereignty and right to self 
determination.123 It is the two Republics "represented by their deputies" 
in the Czech and Slovak National Councils "that have agreed on the 
creation of a Czechoslovak federation".125 26 Yet the new law was adopted 
by the Federal Assembly in accordance with the prevailing procedure for 
a constitutional amendment which does not require, as we have seen, a 
ratification by the Republic National Councils.
b. The options: a model and current patterns
Power allocation entails identifying the subject or the field to be allocated 
(horizontal dimension) and defining the ‘depth’ of the allocated authority 
(vertical dimension).
Horizontally, the power accorded in a discrete field may be exclusive, 
concurrent or shared. Concurrent power may mean either that component 
states are free to act until the federation acts to preempt the field in part or 
in full; or that the states act except where action by the federation serves 
the common purpose more efficiently than would individual state actions - 
the old-new principle of subsidiarity.127 Shared power may entail joint 
federal and state action ranging from notification, consultation, supervision 
by the federation to codecision.
Vertically, the federation may be accorded full powers to legislate, to 
enact implementing regulations and to execute them; or it may be given 
only legislative power (embracing any legislation or limited to basic 
principles and organizational structures) with the rest of the powers in the 
field left with the component states. Even where the federation is accorded
125 Const. Law 103/1991 Sb., supra n. 98, Preamble and art. 4(1). The sovereignty of 
the common state is also recognized, art. 1(5).
126 Ibid. Preamble last para.
127 For interesting definitions of subsidiarity, see Grundgesetz [Basic Law] art. 
72(2)(F.R.G.); Treaty of European Union and Final Act [Maastricht Treaty], done Feb. 
7, 1992, tit. II, art. 3(b)(5), 31 I.L.M. 247, 257-58 (1992) (inserting a new art. 3b into 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community), also in The New Treaty 




























































































powers to legislate and implement, the execution may be reserved to the 
states.
Unallocated powers remain with the states. Finally, the constitution may 
empower the federation to ‘re-delegate’ certain of its powers to the 
states.128
In practice, federal constitutions employ the ‘enumerated powers’ pattern, 
with or without the exclusivity concept, but invariably leaving 
non-enumerated powers to the component states. Apart from this common 
thread, however, the allocative patterns vary greatly from one constitution 
to another, evidently shaped by local, idiosyncratic influences. The German 
Basic Law, which employs exclusive and concurrent categories, presents on 
its face, the most logical scheme; however, it has been brought out of kilter 
by subsequent amendments and - above all - by a powerful drive toward 
centralization, comparable to the forces that have made the United States 
Congress practically all-powerful. The details of the allocation patterns in 
federal constitutions range from the sparse list in the United States 
Constitution to the wildly casuistic Swiss Constitution which went so far as 
to allocate the authority to issue gambling permits in "Kursalen".129
c. The text
The 1968 Constitution was the starting point of the negotiations for the re­
distribution of powers. The new scheme however, reflects the pressure from 
the Slovak side toward broadening the Republic authority at the cost of the 
center. In contrast to the 1968 pattern,130 the new text omits the listing of 
exclusive federal and shared competences.131 *Instead, it
128 For a useful list illustrating the many potential combinations, see Krecht, supra n. 
124 at 729.
129 Salons in a spa. Constitution Fédérale, art. 35(2) (Switz.), translated in Constitutions, 
supra n. 112 (Switz. by G.H. Flanz and G.E. Klein).
130 Const. Law 143/1968, supra n. 112, arts. 7-9; also in contrast to the draft of the 
Civic Forum’s First Draft o f the Constitution of Feb. 1, 1990, arts. 30-32.
131 The trichotomy of exclusive federal, concurrent federal-state, exclusive state
competences, with undelegated powers remaining in component states prevailed in the
Soviet Constitutions and still applies in the German Basic Law and in Canada. German
Basic Law, supra n. 127, principally arts. 71-74. Grospic, "Zâkonodâmâ pravomoc a





























































































(1) enumerates subjects falling generally in the competence of the 
federation with no indication of any limits on the horizontal dimension 
of the federal power (foreign affairs, war and peace, defense, currency, 
federal material resources and protection of the federal Constitution),132
(2) singles out federal competences in enumerated subject areas, limited - 
at the vertical dimension - in principle to legislative action, except where 
the constitutional law provides otherwise,133
(3) leaves all unallocated competences to the Republics.134
In the second category of ‘singled out’ competences, federal power is 
defined in often indeterminate terms, e.g. "formation of strategy" or 
"structural concepts with federal significance," or "common principles" 
(Arts. 10, 17), signalling the intention to limit federal action either to the 
German-type framework legislation (Rahmengesetz),135 or at most to 
ordinary legislation.136
Thus, federal power includes basic legislation on general economic policy 
planning, transportation, environment, price and wage policy, labor 
relations, statistics, regulations of ownership and enterprises, protection of 
consumers and of basic rights. The power to implement and execute federal 
legislation, however, is in principle in the hands of the Republic institutions, 
with the exception of customs, sea, air and railroad transportation, and 
supervision of nuclear safety in which the federation was given expressly 
the entire panoply of power.137 Although the federation has the power to 
legislate on the protection of competition it is specifically left to the Federal
132 Const. Law 103/1991, supra n. 98, art. 7(1). The list corresponds essentially to the 
enumeration of exclusive federal subjects in art. 7(1) o f the 1968 Constitutional Law.
133 Ibid. art. 28b(2).
134 Ibid. art. 9.
135 German Basic Law, supra n. 127, art. 75.
136 See infra text accompanying n. 152 (discussing the Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation).




























































































Assembly to determine the "division of execution" between the federation 
and the Republics.138
In other provisions federal power was defined in such terms as "legal 
disposition," "legislative disposition," "determination of uniform rules," 
"organization and direction," which, as we shall see, have already raised 
questions as to the reach of federal jurisdiction in the vertical 
dimension.139
Financial and budgetary policy is determined by agreement among the 
federal government and the governments of the two Republics; the Federal 
Assembly enacts principal tax legislation (value added and income taxes) 
but the Republics administer it. The Federal Assembly decides on the 
allocation of proceeds.140 Thus far the three governments have succeeded 
in reaching an agreement on the budget based on a previous formula, said 
to favor the Slovaks, but there is no provision for the contingency that an 
agreement proves impossible.
Although the Slovak side first pressed for including in the Constitution 
a division between the Federation and the Republics of publicly owned 
resources and facilities, the idea was abandoned when it became clear that 
any effort for an all-inclusive enumeration would be incomplete - and the 
solution was left with the political process.141 The Federal Assembly, 
however, is given explicit authority to determine ownership of the vital oil 
and gas pipelines and certain electric networks.142 *
As a compromise, the original idea of establishing three separate central 
banks was dropped in favor of a single federal State Central Bank with
138 Ibid. art. 24e.
139 Infra section 4. See also Const. Law 103/1991, supra n. 98, art. 12(4) regarding 
administration of the tax laws. The legislative power of the Federal Assembly is 
expressly confirmed in art. 37(1).
140 Arts. 11(1), 12.
141 Art. 4(3)-(7). For an example of a constitution that does specify the resources owned 
by the federation see Constituigao Federal art. 20 (Braz.), translated in Constitutions, 
supra n. 112, (Braz. by Albert P. Blaustein).
142 Const. Law 103/1991, supra n. 98, art. 4(4). Earlier constitutional law lists certain 
resources (mineral wealth, basic sources of energy, "basic forest fund", waters, etc.) as 
within "state ownership" without indicating Federal or Republic ownership. "Details" are




























































































‘centers’ of that Bank established for each of the Republics, although the 
role of the centers is not specified.143
Further federal legislative authority, limited, however, "to the extent 
required by the uniformity o f the legal order," covers nationality, ethnic 
minorities, churches, health, lower education, copyright and other 
matters.144 This limitation on the federal legislative powers, carried over 
from the 1968 Constitution, is, in a sense, a variant of the subsidiarity 
concept, motivated, however, by legal coherence rather than by preservation 
of component state power.
History played a major role in shaping one important aspect of the power 
allocation. Typically, upon creation of a federation, a federal grid is 
superimposed on preexisting legal orders of states entering the federation: 
federal law is interstitial and supplementary. In 1918 Czechoslovakia, 
however, two different legal orders were embraced within a unitary state, 
one based on Austrian, the other on Hungarian law. After World War II, in 
the still unitary state, the two legal orders were replaced with a uniform 
system of law; and it was in 1968 that the federal scheme was overlayed 
upon the uniform legal system. Preservation of uniformity was in potential 
conflict with the new law-making powers of the two Republics. The 
resulting compromise145 keeps the bulk of the uniform legal order - 
including the civil, commercial and criminal codes - within the orbit of 
federal legislative power, but where the federation does not preempt the 
entire field the Republics may legislate. In any event, the "execution" of 
these codes and laws pertains to the Republics, and the Federal Assembly 
may "redelegate" its authority to the Republics.146
143 The Law on the Czechoslovak State Bank 22/1992 Sb., was modeled after the 
German Bundesbank legislation. It was passed along with a general banking legislation. 
See Martin, "Banking Reform in Czechoslovakia," RFE/RL Research Rep., Apr. 10, 
1992, at 29.
144 Compare Const. Law 103/1991, art. 37(3), supra n. 98, with Const. Law 143/1968, 
supra n. 112, art. 37(3) (the latter providing a more extensive enumeration); see also 
Const. Law 103/1991, supra n. 98, arts. 5,6 (addressing in the "Basic Provisions" 
citizenship and equality o f the Czech and Slovak languages).
145 Ibid. art. 37(2).
146 Ibid. arts. 37(2), 38(l)-(2). Here also, Const. Law 103/1991 essentially carries over 





























































































The opaque lines between the federal and Republic competences of the 
1968 text were blurred further in the 1990 law. A number of important 
issues that proved beyond the reach of a consensus were either omitted or 
left to the Federal Assembly. The actual scope of the intended devolution 
in domestic matters will be determined by practical application.
It is in the area of foreign affairs which touches directly upon the 
"external sovereignty" and international personality of the federation, that - 
on its face at any rate - the expansion of the Republic power is most 
evident. The Federal authorities negotiate international treaties, legislate the 
basic lines and instrumentalities of foreign economic policy and provide for 
representation of the common state abroad.147 The Republics maintain 
their authority to participate in negotiations of international treaties and in 
the representation in international organizations on matters falling within the 
legislative competence of the Federation.148 In addition, however, they 
acquire a measure of their own international personality. In the first place, 
the Republics may, "in harmony" with federal foreign policy, conclude 
agreements with component parts of other composite states for cooperation 
on a broad spectrum of subjects ranging from economy and commerce to 
culture, health and television. More importantly, they may conclude, when 
so authorized by the Federation, international agreements on matters within 
their legislative competence, and they may maintain their own 
representation abroad and receive foreign representatives on the same 
matters.149 * The important question of the modalities of the federal 
authorization remains open and will be regulated presumably by a federal 
law.
d. The emerging jurisdictional conflicts: The Constitutional Court speaks
Even a cursory perusal of the text of the 1990 law reveals many 
ambiguities bound to result in conflicting claims of competence between the 
Federation and the Republics. This was already the situation under the 1968 
text but - in the words of a Czechoslovak commentator - these differences 
were resolved at the time "during the elaboration of the legislation and
147 Const. Law 103/1991, supra n. 98, arts. 7(l)a, 16, 36(l)b, 36(3).
148 Ibid. art. 25.
149 Ibid. art. 7(2)c. The status of the representatives is to be determined by the receiving
state. I shall deal with the foreign affairs powers problem and international law




























































































other political decisions." "It is for this reason that during the... years of the 
functioning of the Czechoslovak federation [under the old regime] no 
conflict had arisen that would have had to be resolved by specific 
constitutional measures," that is by the Constitutional Court which was 
provided for in the Constitution but never made operational.150
With the end of ‘the guiding role of the Communist party’ and ‘socialist 
legality’, the need for an authoritative dispute settlement of jurisdictional 
quarrels became imperative. Who, for instance, regulates forests when 
agriculture policy is federal but the Republics own the forests? In some 
cases, where federal legislative power was clear but the authority to adopt 
urgently needed implementing uniform regulations was disputed (e.g. on 
pensions), the federal government, to avoid controversy proposed new 
legislation, instead of issuing a regulation that would be the normal course. 
This technique, while feasible in a few exceptional instances, obviously 
could not be employed as a general procedure. Anticipating a plethora of 
challenges to its power, the federal government proposed to clarify the 
vertical-dimension ambiguity in a new proposal, which, however, has not 
been acted upon thus far.151
Happily, the Constitutional Court (six Czechs and six Slovaks) was 
established since 1991,152 and its first case dealing with a jurisdictional 
conflict is a harbinger of things to come.153 *The federal Ministry of 
Communications asked the Court to resolve a dispute over the interpretation 
of the 1990 law with respect to jurisdiction over the communications 
network. The principal provision at issue appears to distinguish between the 
three branches of the system: posts, radio communications and
150 Zacharias, Rapport Tchechoslovaque, 17 Revue beige de droit international 138 at 
139-40 (1983).
151 Proposal for the chapter of the Constitution dealing with the distribution of 
competences between the Federation and its Republics elaborated according to the 
position of the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, Dec. 31, 
1991, Prague, C.j. 2956/91-PV.
152 Const. Law 91/1991 Sb. on the Constitutional Court of the CSFR; Law 491/1991 Sb. 
on the Organization of the Constitutional Court of the CSFR and Proceedings Before It. 
See also Schwartz, The New Constitutional Courts in Eastern Europe, 13 Mich.J.Int’1 
L. (1992).
153 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic,




























































































telecommunications,154 and the Court was faced with the unenviable task 
to define, and apply the puzzling textual variations.
In the article in question (Art. 20), the federation was given the 
competence for
issuing uniform traffic rules and tariffs for all three branches (para, b),
providing "legislative disposition" on posts and telecommunications 
(para, a),
organizing a "uniform system of posts" (para, d),
organizing and directing a uniform system of telecommunications 
(para, e).155
Seizing upon the single word "directing" which appears only in 
connection with telecommunications, the Court ruled that in that field the 
federation possesses the entire gamut of powers ranging from legislation, 
generally binding implementing regulations, to administration and individual 
decisions. Regarding posts and radio communications, the Republics have 
the competence of administration, with the federation confined to the 
issuance of uniform traffic rules.156
The Court found support for this conclusion in two general provisions: 
in the principle of "enumerated powers"157 and in the rule reserving 
"execution" of federal legislation to the Republics unless a constitutional
154 Const. Law 103/1991, supra n. 98, art. 20.
155 Ibid. art. 20c authorizes the Federation to issue stamps or other postal values.
156 The competence to administer includes, according to the ruling, the authority to 
organize state agencies or enterprises in the respective fields of communications. The 
Court does not seem to be impressed by the fact that in other instances where the 
Constitutional Law allocates the power of administration to the federation it says so 
using the specific terms "state administration" or "execution"; but neither of these terms 
is employed with regard to telecommunications. See, e.g. ibid. arts. 19d-e, 21b. 
"Execution" according to the Court, encompasses administration, organization and 
direction.




























































































law provides otherwise.158 Perhaps more importantly, the Court relied on 
history of the constitutional development which it read as indicating the 
intent of the constitution makers to change the regime of radio 
communications and posts in favor of the Republics while retaining federal 
administration of telecommunications as it has
existed since 1971. The Court, however, pointedly referred to the possibility 
of a "redelegation" of the execution of federal competences to the Republics 
by a law of the Federal Assembly.159
In the reasoning part of the opinion the Court throws some light on 
certain indeterminate concepts: "legislative disposition" means power to 
enact legislation only, while "legal disposition" includes the additional 
authority to issue "generally binding legal rules for implementation of 
legislation."160 Beyond that, however, the opinion focuses scrupulously on 
the specific clauses at issue; and it follows the narrow path of a textual and 
contextual method of interpretation, with a glance at prior legislative 
practice.
Unlike some other constitutional courts (such as the United States 
Supreme Court, the Court of Justice of the European Communities or the 
German Constitutional Court) the Czecho-Slovak counterpart shows no 
ambition at this early state to fashion fundamental constitutional principles 
or to offer a grand doctrinal design for the new federation. Nor does it
158 Ibid. art. 28(2). Presumably the term "directing" is taken to provide the exception 
contemplated in this provision.
159 Ibid., art. 28b(l). The Court points out that the original text of Const. Law 143/1968 
Sb. art. 20 entrusted the federation with legislation, determination of uniform rules and 
conception of development of the post and telecommunications systems; but it did not 
contain a provision analogous to the present text of art. 20e. See supra text 
accompanying note 155. The current state o f the law has prevailed since Const. Law 
125/1970 Sb. on Communications had come into effect, and Const. Law 550/1990 Sb. 
did not bring about any change in the federal competences to organize and direct the 
telecommunications system. In an interesting passage the Court deals with the arguments 
of the Republics based on administrative agreements between the federal and Republic 
Ministries and minutes o f sessions of the Prime Ministers. Although denying its own 
competence to pass upon the validity of such instruments it considers them useful aids 
for interpretation to the extent that they are not in conflict with prevailing law. In the 
given situation the Court disregarded them as contrary to its interpretation of the 1990 
Constitutional Law.





























































































meditate over the consequences of its ruling which affirms as 
constitutionally mandated a schism between the modes of operation of the 
communications system, whatever problems this may entail for the economy 
of the common state. Clearly, the Court is not willing to add to its burden - 
heavy as it is - of having to resolve ambiguities due more to a lack of 
political consensus than to drafting inadequacies. This reticence may reflect 
the prevailing concept of limited judicial function even at the highest level, 
as well as the tension in the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks.
It has been suggested that the Republics will be viewed as "the 
losers".161 Although the decision preserves the unity of the 
telecommunications branch of the system under one body, "it heralds the 
eventual demonopolization of the network" since this is the policy of the 
current federal Minister. That policy, opponents claim, will jeopardize 
present projects for massive foreign investments designed to modernize the 
system.162
In contrast with domestic matters, surprisingly, there has been little 
controversy in practice over the application of the foreign affairs powers in 
the new law. Rumor has it that an ambassador of Slovak nationality insisted 
on reporting to Bratislava rather than to Prague and one hears complaints 
of insufficient Slovak representation in the federal diplomatic service. 
However, the somewhat controversial first chief of the Slovak Ministry of 
International Relations was replaced by a young scientist reputedly with a 
realistic conception of his role within a limited budget. The Czech 
counterpart Ministry was established in 1992 only with a minimal staff.163 *
The practice developed by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs ever 
since the 1968 Constitutional Law has been to include Slovak participation 
in federal treaty making proceedings and it has now been extended to 
commercial treaties. The Federal government is experimenting with the idea 
of federal framework treaties on matters of shared competence, pursuant to 
which the Republics would conclude their own treaties. Even before the 
1990 Constitutional Law the Republics concluded several agreements with 
components of other states (Bavaria, the Russian Socialist Federal Republic, 
a Chinese province). The Republics maintain a variety of foreign contacts
161 "Court Ruling May Threaten Telecommunications Monopoly," Prague Post, Apr. 21- 
27, 1992, at 4.
162 Ibid.





























































































of their own in matters of their legislative competence such as education, 
health, and culture, so that the two Republic Ministries are sufficiently 
occupied without crossing wires with the Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The situation could change, of course, if for instance the original 
incumbent is returned to the Slovak Ministry.
At times foreign missions are at a loss about their interlocutors on the 
Czech and Slovak sides. On treaties of general import, such as investment 
treaties, they negotiate with the federal government, but when it comes to 
economic or technical assistance they deal with Republic authorities as well. 
In some instances foreign diplomats prefer not to seek guidance from 
federal authorities in order not to be precluded from dealing with the 
Republics.
In the first series of our meetings - with the problem of jurisdictional 
conflicts in mind - we urged the adoption in the new constitution of a 
supremacy clause that would assure priority, within the allocated power, of 
federal over Republic legislation: modern constitutions have adopted the 
supremacy doctrine either in an express constitutional provision164 or by 
implication and practice.165
164 Constituclon Argentina art. 31, translated in Constitutions, supra n. 112 (Arg. by F. 
C. Roth); Austl. Const. Ch. V, art. 109; German Basic Law, supra n. 127, art. 31; 
Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 133, translated in 
Constitutions, supra n. 112 (Mex. by G.H. Flanz and L. Moreno); U.S. Const, art. VI, 
cl. 2; Fed Const. Malaysia art. 75, translated in Constitutions, supra n. 112 (Malay, by 
H.E. Graves and S.A. Holt); Const. Nigeria ch. I, pt. II, §4(5) in Constitutions, supra n. 
112 (Nig. by C. Tenney); Const. Pakistan art. 143 in Constitutions, supra n. 112 (Pak. 
by L. Wolf-Phillips, G. Mohammed and Abert P. Blaustein).
165 Austria: R. Walter and H. Mayer, Grundriss des osterreichischen Verfassungsrechts, 
6. ed., Part n , 4IV8, Part V. 1IEB (Wien, 1988); R. Walter, "Der Stufenbau nach der 
derogatorischen Kraft im osterreichischen Recht," 1965 ÔJZ 168 at 171; Belgium: so- 
called "primauté", Rusen Ergec, Introduction au Droit Public at 21 (1990); Brazil: 
conclusion from art. 24 (4); Sabid Maluf, Direito Constitucional, 3. ed. at 117 (Sao 
Paulo, 1974); Canada: so-called "paramountcy1', decisions of the Privy Council, Hodge 
v. The Queen, 9 A.C. 117 (1883), Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General for 
Canada, (1894) A.C. 189; Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2. ed, Chapter 16 
(Toronto, 1985); India: Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., A.I.R. (1956) S.C. 698-699; 
Switzerland: conclusion from art. 3 o f the Constitution and art. 2 of the transitory 
provisions of the Constitution, M. Imboden, Bundesrecht bricht kantonales Recht, Diss. 





























































































No such clause was contained in the 1968 Constitutional Law on the 
theory that federal and Republic competences - as delimited in the 
Constitution - were of equal hierarchic standing. To an outsider, the need 
for the clause appeared even more pressing under the 1990 law for reasons 
adrumbrated earlier. Yet it became clear at an early stage that such a clause 
would not be acceptable, because - apart from the doctrinal objection - it 
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